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Partially due to the widespread use of employee confidentiality and
invention assignment agreements, employers routinely take ownership of
employee creative outputs and use trade secrets law to enforce those rights
post-employment.  This Article proposes that, with respect to employee
creative outputs, the current status of trade secrets law is inconsistent with
the modern workplace, including as significantly altered, maybe perma-
nently, by the COVID-19 pandemic.  Accordingly, the goal of this Article is
to establish a mode of recognizing employee rights in their own creative
outputs through a modification to the existing general skills and knowl-
edge exclusion to explicitly recognize an employee’s own creative outputs
as subject to the exclusion.  The proposal, if adopted, would provide em-
ployees with increased autonomy over their own creative outputs and
greater ability to chart their own careers in their chosen field without fear
of trade secrets misappropriation claims from former employers.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
HOW does a departing employee misappropriate a trade secret whenleaving their employment?  Does it matter if the departing employee
created the trade secret, assisted in its creation, or provided no contribu-
tion whatsoever?  Under current trade secrets law,1 including as recently
expanded (into a federal civil cause of action) by the Defend Trade
Secrets Act (DTSA), the answer to the first question is quite obvious: de-
parting employees misappropriate trade secrets in a variety of ways, but
generally, the common thread is that they take some information with
them that is owned2 by their employer, rather than owned by themselves.3
Similarly, the answer to the second question, “No,” is fairly well-established
under existing law.4  However, this was not always the case.  Looking back
1. As discussed in Section I below, trade secrets law varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.  References to “trade secrets law” in this Article will refer to general
principles of trade secrets law as it has developed over the last 150 years, and as it is
generally reflected in the DTSA and UTSA; it will not be specific to any particular
jurisdiction or statute unless stated expressly.
2. This Article uses the concept of “ownership” here for simplicity.  However,
this should not be seen as an embrace of the notion that trade secrets are property
that is “owned” in a property sense.  The question of whether trade secrets are
property is as old as trade secrets law itself and continues to the modern day. See
Ownership in a Plan, 20 HARV. L. REV. 143, 143 (1906) (discussing several trade
secrets cases and concluding that there is no property right in trade secrets); see,
e.g., Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and Consequences, 15 J. IN-
TELL. PROP. 39, 66–84 (2007) (detailing several theoretical approaches to classify-
ing trade secrets, including the property theory); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising
Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 324 (2008) (dis-
cussing trade secrets law theoretically, including the property view of trade
secrets).
3. See, e.g., Aday v. Westfield Ins., 486 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1169 (S.D. Ohio 2020)
(reviewing several emails a departing employee sent to personal email account and
concluding the emails contain trade secrets); Freedom Med., Inc. v. Sewpersaud,
469 F. Supp. 3d 1269, 1275 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (concluding that departing employee
took trade secrets in the form of general business information and customer lists);
Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Chung, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (reviewing
trade secrets claims against several former employees involving both business infor-
mation and technical information).
4. See, e.g., Pullman Grp. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 288 A.D.2d 2, 3 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001) (“[T]he alleged trade secrets were created by Pullman while acting within
the scope of his assigned duties as an employee of Gruntal and Fahnestock respon-
sible for designing and promoting investment banking transactions, and any such
trade secrets were therefore owned by the employers ab initio.” (citations omit-
ted)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 (AM. LAW INST. 1995)
(“In the absence of a contrary agreement, the law ordinarily assigns ownership of
an invention or idea to the person who conceives it.  However, valuable informa-
tion that is the product of an employee’s assigned duties is owned by the employer,
even when the information results from the application of the employee’s personal
knowledge or skill . . . .”). But see Yuval Feldman, The Behavioral Foundations of Trade
Secrets: Tangibility, Authorship, and Legality, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 197, 200
(2006) (discussing inconsistent results in different courts based, at least in part, on
whether the employee participated in the creation of the alleged trade secrets);
Miles J. Feldman, Comment, Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable Information:
Trade Secrets and the Employment Relationship, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 151, 166 (1994) (not-
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to the early development of trade secrets law, the question of whether the
employee created, or helped to create, the trade secret could be an impor-
tant consideration in whether a misappropriation had occurred, particu-
larly in the absence of a contract on the issue.5
This Article proposes that employees should have rights in their own
creative outputs6 that transcend employment or employers, and that trade
secrets law should not be a vehicle to expropriate those rights from em-
ployees—even in the presence of an employment agreement purporting
to resolve the issue in favor of the employer.  To put it more concretely,
trade secrets law should not be the enforcement mechanism, or facilitate
the enforcement of, an employment contract purporting to transfer all
rights in an employee’s creative outputs to the employer, as it currently
does under existing law.
This discussion is particularly important at this moment in the na-
tion’s history.  Trade secrets law, and particularly the relationship between
employees and employers with respect to trade secrets, developed during
the early industrial revolution, a time that is fundamentally different than
ing inconsistency in trade secrets decisions where employee participated in the
creation of the trade secrets at issue).
5. See Nat’l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 13 Ohio C.D. 468, 473 (Ct. App. 1902),
aff’d, 69 Ohio St. 560, 70 N.E. 1127 (1903) (“[T]he natural rule of right is this:
That a man shall have the benefit of all his intelligent thought and enterprise, of
all that he may discover by industry and ingenuity, and unless he contracts to sell
some other man that idea, he may use it for his own benefit or for the benefit of
any employer he may afterward find service with.” (footnote omitted)).  This is not
to suggest that National Tube is a definitive statement of the law on this issue as it
existed at the time.  It is important to also recognize that National Tube could be
seen to place particular, maybe dispositive, emphasis on the fact that the former
employer did not have a contract.  Moreover, some other courts at the time
reached decisions to the opposite effect with respect to employee-created innova-
tions. See, e.g., Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 115 (Sup. Ct. 1892),
aff’d sub nom. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Reichenbach, 29 N.Y.S. 1143 (Gen. Term
1894) (“By a careful reading of the various decisions upon this subject, it will be
seen that some are made to depend upon a breach of an express contract between
the parties, while others proceed upon the theory that, where a confidential rela-
tion exists between two or more parties engaged in a business venture, the law
raises an implied contract between them that the employe[e] will not divulge any
trade secrets imparted to him or discovered by him in the course of his employ-
ment . . . .”); see also Bernard C. Steiner, Trade Secrets, 14 YALE L.J. 374, 377 (1904-
1905) (providing brief case review with respect to the distinction between secrets
disclosed to an employee and those discovered by the employee).  For additional
discussion of the early development on this issue, see Yuval Feldman, supra note 4,
at 200–04.  For additional discussion of the evolution of employer rights in patent-
able inventions, see Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ From the ‘Fire of
Genius’: Law and the Employee Inventor, 1830–1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1173
(1998).
6. The term “creative outputs” is used here to refer to all of the information
work product an employee generates as part of their employment, independent of
whether that particular work product is innovative or ordinary.  In other words,
there is no test (e.g., novelty, obviousness, value, etc.) for whether a particular
piece of information constitutes an employee’s creative output beyond the ques-
tion of whether the employee generated the particular information.
4
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the world we live in today.7  In an effort to protect employers from losing
their most fundamental, and in some cases existential, business secrets,
courts would hold that trade secrets were owned by the employer even in
the absence of an express contract to that effect.8  This development con-
tinued unabated to the present day, despite the employee/employer rela-
tionship dramatically shifting due to decreased long-term commitment by
employers to their employees and decreased loyalty by employees to their
employers.9  This development was also facilitated by widespread use of
employee confidentiality and invention assignment agreements.10
Even before the significant challenges that currently face the country
arose, some were already challenging the continuing validity of a broad
trade secrets jurisprudence, which favors employers, in view of current em-
ployment practices.11  However, the current moment provides even more
impetus to challenge the underpinnings of trade secrets law as we con-
sider research addressing racial and gender disparities in the modern
7. To compare the late Industrial Revolution fact pattern of Peabody v. Norfolk
with the modern, high-technology workplace of Cisco Systems v. Chung, see infra
note 20 and supra note 3.
8. See Eastman, 20 N.Y.S. at 115 (reviewing early decisions on the issue of em-
ployee-created inventions).
9. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of
Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 722 (2002) (discuss-
ing the perspectives of employees and employers in the modern information
economy).
10. See Ann Bartow, Inventors of the World, Unite! A Call for Collective Action by
Employee-Inventors, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 673, 674 (1997); Orly Lobel, The New
Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L.
REV. 789, 813 (2015); see also Syndicated Servs., Inc. v. Yarbrough, No. 16 CVS
20912, 2017 WL 663515, at *2 (N.C. Super. Feb. 15, 2017) (complaint alleges “[a]ll
of the Corporation’s employees were required to sign a Confidentiality and
NonCircumvention Agreement . . . . Execution of the Confidentiality Agreement
was a condition precedent to Defendant’s employment by the Corporation.”).
11. See, e.g., Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: The Dangers of Strengthening
Domestic Trade Secret Rights in Response to Cyber-Misappropriation, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH.
172, 227 (2013) (arguing that enactment of federal civil trade secrets legislation
would upset employee-employer balance, in favor of employers, of then-existing
trade secrets law); Jay L. Koh, From Hoops to Hard Drives: An Accession Law Approach
to the Inevitable Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 271, 298 (1998)
(discussing the asymmetries between evaluation of employee versus employer in-
terests in trade secrets litigation); Nathan Newman, Trade Secrets and Collective Bar-
gaining: A Solution to Resolving Tensions in the Economics of Innovation, 6 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 26 (2002) (arguing that trade secrets law allows employers to use
the law as a tactic to prevent employee mobility); Steven Wilf, Trade Secrets, Property,
and Social Relations, 34 CONN. L. REV. 787, 791 (2002) (asserting that increasing
prominence of trade secrets as property theory has tipped the balance between
employers and employees decidedly in favor of employers).
5
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workplace,12 questions about the proper role of corporations in society,13
and empirical studies demonstrating the illusory nature of consent in the
context of individual contracting.14  Moreover, as the world’s major phar-
maceutical companies race to develop and deploy vaccines for the COVID-
19 virus,15 some question the intellectual property implications on the
fruits of that research.16  Accordingly, now is an ideal time to consider the
12. See generally Grace Brainard, Disrupting Implicit Racial Biases in the Workplace:
Rethinking Affirmative Action in the Wake of Ricci v. DeStefano, 2 GEO. J.L. & MOD.
CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 53, 59-64 (2010) (discussing racial disparities in the work-
place); Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 283, 285 (2003) (addressing gender disparities associated with increased
remote work).  In addition to the disparities that exist in the workplace generally,
there are also disparities in the innovation ecosystem. See USPTO Launches National
Council for Expanding American Innovation (NCEAI), USPTO (Sept. 14, 2020), https:/
/www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/uspto-launches-national-council-ex-
panding-american-innovation-nceai [https://perma.cc/KC3F-A3QC] (U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office press release announcing the creation of the National
Council for Expanding American Innovation to “help guide the USPTO in devel-
oping a comprehensive national strategy to build a more diverse and inclusive in-
novation ecosystem”).
13. See, e.g., Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote
‘An Economy That Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019) https://
www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-cor-
poration-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/
46VT-GXBV] (suggesting corporations should operate in consideration of the in-
terests of all stakeholders, rather than just shareholders).  Although the current
reevaluation of corporate practices is around shareholder primacy, a renewed in-
terest in the operation and priorities within corporations could also consider the
equity of requiring employees to assign all of their creative outputs as a condition
of employment.
14. See generally Roseanna Sommers, Contract Schemas, ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
(forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3767209 [https://perma.cc/
24Z4-J535].  Professor Sommers’ work suggests that individuals signing contracts
expect that the terms will be enforced irrespective of their agreement with them,
feel an obligation to comply with the contract even when it is against their interest,
and believe the contracts contain hidden dangers under which they have forfeited
rights.  These findings may also be relevant to the employment contracts employ-
ees are routinely required to sign as a condition of employment that assign all of
their creative outputs to the employer.
15. See Clifton Leaf, ‘The Whole World is Coming Together’: How the Race for a
COVID Vaccine is Revolutionizing Big Pharma, FORTUNE (Sept. 21, 2020), https://
fortune.com/longform/covid-vaccine-big-pharma-drugmakers-coronavirus-phar-
maceutical-industry/ [https://perma.cc/SU6Q-L4KE].
16. See Sapna Kumar, Compulsory Licensing of Patents During Pandemics (forth-
coming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3636456 [https://perma.cc/7HDN-
MKA5] (discussing international responses to patent issues raised by the COVID-
19 pandemic); Ann Danaiya Usher, South Africa and India Push for COVID-19 Patents
Ban, 396 World Report 1790, 1790–91 (2020) (discussing India’s and South Af-
rica’s requests to the WTO to suspend IP rights associated with COVID-19 vac-
cines); Daniel Shores, Breaking Down Moderna’s COVID-19 Patent Pledge: Why Did
They Do it?, IP WATCHDOG (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/
11/11/breaking-modernas-covid-19-patent-pledge/id=127224/ [https://perma.
cc/6JFY-UKY8] (discussing major pharmaceutical company’s pledge not to enforce
its patent rights against other vaccine manufacturers).  This reevaluation of intel-
lectual property rights is primarily driven by the desire to overcome obstacles that
6
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implications for the researchers working in these companies,17 and em-
ployees generally.
For the sake of making the issue more concrete, consider the exam-
ple of a software engineer or coder employee at an established software
firm.  This scenario relies on certain assumptions about this employment
situation.  First, the employee was hired to write software code for the
firm’s primary products, based upon the employee’s prior experience or
education.  Second, the employment is at-will, and this is an industry
where employee movement is common or foreseeable.  Third, the em-
ployee’s starting wage (and future wages) are set largely by market forces
(i.e., a competitive wage set in view of the prevailing market rates).  Fi-
nally, the bulk of the employee’s work outputs will be based on standard
coding principles or techniques applied to the specific context of the
firm’s software product(s) and, occasionally, the employee will produce
innovative solutions to challenges posed by the specific context of the
firm’s software product(s), but generalizable to many other software prod-
ucts, or software generally.  What are we to make of this employee’s crea-
tive outputs?  Without question, the employer will: consider itself the
owner of those creative outputs, both the mundane and the revolutionary;
have contracts signed by the employee transferring all rights in those crea-
tive outputs to the employer; and consider it to be misappropriation of
trade secrets for the employee to leave with any of those creative outputs,
whether taken in memory or taken in tangible or electronic form.  The
position taken in this Article is that the employer should not be able to use
trade secrets law to enforce these assumptions.  In other words: the em-
ployee should retain rights in their own creative outputs; the contracts the
employee was required to sign as a condition of employment should not
extinguish those rights (via trade secrets law); and the employee is free to
take those creative outputs with them to future employment, in either in-
tangible, tangible, or electronic form, without fear of a trade secrets mis-
appropriation claim.
IP may place in the way of rapid development of vaccines and widespread distribu-
tion. Id.  However, trade secrets law, and its associated ability to minimize em-
ployee mobility, may also impact the speed with which vaccines are developed and
deployed. See Steven Hollman, Trade Secret Protection & the COVID-19 Cure: Observa-
tions on Federal Policy-Making & Potential Impact on Biomedical Advances, JD SUPRA
(Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/trade-secret-protection-the-
covid-19-37383/ [https://perma.cc/4GEE-R77G] (discussing trade secrets issues
associated with COVID-19 vaccine development).
17. These researchers may provide the toughest counterpoint to the positions
taken in this Article for a couple of reasons.  First, they may be the type of employ-
ees hired to innovate and may be receiving compensation sufficient to fully coun-
tervail for the assignment of rights in their individual creative outputs.  Second,
these are presumably highly educated and qualified individuals who would have
been more likely to be protected under the traditional general skills and knowl-
edge exclusion, independent of their individual contributions. See Camilla A.
Hrdy, The General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Paradox, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2409, 2463
(2019) (reviewing cases where employee’s level of education informed the general
skills and knowledge determination).
7
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The focus of this Article is to explore ways in which trade secrets law
could be used to accomplish the goal of establishing at least some em-
ployee rights in their own creative outputs.  The Article proceeds to de-
velop a proposal to accomplish the goal, explore the justifications for such
a proposal, and discuss the potential impacts that might follow if the pro-
posal were adopted.  Part I provides relevant background on the develop-
ment of trade secrets law generally.  Part II discusses some potential
justifications for modifying existing trade secrets law to further the goal.
Part III presents the proposal to use the general skills and knowledge ex-
clusion as the vehicle to accomplish the goal.  Part IV presents some possi-
ble impacts to firms and employees if the proposal were to be adopted.
Finally, this Article concludes and revisits the plight of our software engi-
neer introduced in this Introduction.
I. BACKGROUND
Trade secrets law got its start in the United States18 in the mid-nine-
teenth century, beginning with the case of Vickery v. Welch.19  However, an
early case closer to the issues in this Article is Peabody v. Norfolk.20 Norfolk
involved a seemingly simple scenario by the standards of today’s trade
secrets cases.  An employer disclosed secret processes for the manufacture
of gunny cloth to an employee, with the employee being under a contrac-
tual obligation not to disclose those secrets.21  Then, the employee de-
parted to work for or establish a competing firm using the employer’s
trade secrets.22  The court held that the employer had protectable secrets
and the employee was liable for misappropriating those secrets.23  This
18. Some have suggested that trade secrets law has its origins in ancient
Rome. See A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and Roman Law; The Actio Servi Corrupti,
30 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (1930).  However, more recently, others have cast doubt on
this characterization. See Alan Watson, Trade Secrets and Roman Law: The Myth Ex-
ploded, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 19 (1996).  Regardless, even recent commentators
have made reference to the Roman origin story. See, e.g., Richard F. Dole Jr., The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act - Trends and Prospects, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 409, 409 (2010);
Anne C. Keays, Software Trade Secret Protection, 4 SOFTWARE L.J. 577, 577 (1991);
Michael R. McGurk & Jia W. Lu, The Intersection of Patents and Trade Secrets, 7 HAS-
TINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 189, 194 (2015).  Perhaps an even earlier origin is more
likely. See Daniel D. Fetterley, Historical Perspectives on Criminal Laws Relating to the
Theft of Trade Secrets, 25 BUS. LAW. 1535, 1535 n.3 (1970) (citing Hammurabi’s
Code, which mandated “loss of an eye to one caught prying into forbidden
secrets”).
19. 36 Mass. 523 (1837); see also William B. Barton, A Study in the Law of Trade
Secrets, 13 U. CIN. L. REV. 507, 511–15 (1939) (detailing trade secrets law historical
development).
20. 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
21. Id. at 452.
22. Id.
23. Id.  Note that the misappropriation of trade secrets action did not exist in
that name at that time and so the court spoke largely in terms of violations of
duties, rather than in misappropriation of a property right.
8
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scenario is a common fact pattern for many trade secrets cases today.24
However, despite the significant passage of time, many of the departing
employee issues that the court wrestled with in Norfolk remain unresolved
today.
From the beginning, courts and commentators grappled with how to
classify trade secrets rights and how to address information-based commer-
cial wrongs.25  Some of this uncertainty arose due to the split nature of
courts (between law and equity) at the time.26  Despite having a federal
law of trade secrets,27 the question of how to characterize, and justify,
trade secrets law continues to this day.28  Indeed, some have gone so far as
to propose that there is no justification for a separate body of trade secrets
24. See, e.g., Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Chung, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1031 (N.D. Cal.
2020) (detailing a misappropriation suit against former employees and new em-
ployer); AHS Staffing, LLC v. Quest Staffing Grp., 335 F. Supp. 3d 856, 861 (E.D.
Tex. 2018) (misappropriation suit against former employees and new employer);
Agilysys, Inc. v. Hall, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (detailing a mis-
appropriation suit against former employees).
25. See, e.g., Ownership in a Plan, supra note 2, at 143 (discussing whether trade
secrets are property); A. W. Whitlock, The Laws as to Trade Secrets, 74 CENT. L.J. 83,
84 (1912) (discussing trade secrets as property right or right in equity); Note, Basis
of Jurisdiction of the Protection of Trade Secrets, 19 COL. L. REV. 233, 238 (1919) (dis-
cussing whether trade secrets case results are based on property theory and con-
cluding that unfair competition is a more appropriate doctrine to explain the
cases); H. W. Strathman, Property: Unwritten Formula Held to Be Asset of Bankrupt, 8
CORN. L. Q. 174, 174 (1923) (discussing case holding that trade secrets are a prop-
erty asset in bankruptcy proceedings) (citing In re Keene, 2 Ch. (Eng.) 475
(1922)); Note, Nature of Trade Secrets and Their Protection, 42 HARV. L. REV. 254, 255
(1928) (discussing whether trade secrets constitute a property interest); Trade
Secrets. Acquisition of Dominating Patent by Person to Whom Secret Was Disclosed in Confi-
dence During Negotiations for Manufacture, 43 HARV. L. REV. 970, 970–71 (1930) (dis-
cussing the nature of the trade secrets right).
26. See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts
Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L.
REV. 493, 498 (2010).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836.
28. See, e.g., Matthew Edward Cavanaugh, Contract + Tort = Property: The Trade
Secret Illustration, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 427, 450 (2012) (using trade
secrets as an example of a new analytical approach to property rights); Richard A.
Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets Under the Takings Clause, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 57, 59 (2004) (discussing whether trade secrets constitute property);
Lindsey Furtado, Protecting Your Secrets From the Media: A Case for California’s Content-
Neutral Approach to Trade Secret Injunctions, 15 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 123, 135
(2011) (arguing that trade secrets should be viewed as property rights in the con-
text of speech-restricting injunctions); Robert K. Hur, Takings, Trade Secrets, and
Tobacco: Mountain or Molehill?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 447, 468 (2000) (discussing trade
secrets as property in the context of takings jurisprudence); Adam D. Moore, Intel-
lectual Property and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Game Theory Justification of Copyrights,
Patents, and Trade Secrets, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 831, 860
(2018) (using the Prisoner’s Dilemma example to explore theoretical justifications
for trade secrets law); Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back To-
gether, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 415 (2003) (discussing different theories of property
rights and their applicability to trade secrets law development); Jonathan R. K.
Stroud, The Tragedy of the Commons: A Hybrid Approach to Trade Secret Legal Theory, 12
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 232, 234 (2013) (detailing various theoretical justifica-
9
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law.29  Amid this early uncertainty around the theoretical justifications for
trade secrets law, the Restatement (First) of Torts (“First Restatement”)
was published in 1939 and, in addition to clarifying trade secrets law as it
existed at the time, seemed to settle the property versus tort classification
issue.30  However, that resolution did not end the debate.31
The First Restatement included three provisions related to proprie-
tary information, with sections 757 and 758 directed to trade secrets, and
759 directed to other proprietary information.32  Most importantly, the
First Restatement did not define trade secrets directly and instead pro-
vided a list of factors to consider.33  For many decades, the First Restate-
ment represented a primary resource courts looked to in order to address
trade secrets claims, and in particular, courts looked to the six factors to
determine whether the information at issue was in fact a trade secret.
However, in 1965, the American Law Institute chose not to address trade
secrets issues, including non-trade-secret proprietary information, in the
tions for the protection of trade secrets); Wilf, supra note 11, at 797 (describing
different theories of property rights and their applicability to trade secrets).
29. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 297 (1998) (exploring the justifications for trade
secrets law and finding no legal justification for an independent body of trade
secrets law); see also Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law,
92 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1831 (2014) (reviewing recent scholarship on the issue and
reiterating position against an independent body of trade secrets law). But see Vin-
cent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Frame-
work Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 73 (1999) (disputing
Professor Bone’s conclusions in the previous article and proposing normative justi-
fication for trade secrets law).
30. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757–59 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1939)
(“The suggestion that one has a right to exclude others from the use of his trade
secret because he has a right of property in the idea has been frequently advanced
and rejected.”).
31. See, e.g., Note, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 94, 97 (1948) (discussing theories of re-
covery for the use of ideas); John B. Nash, The Concept of Property in Know-How as a
Growing Area of Industrial Property: Its Sale and Licensing, 6 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPY.
J. RES. & ED. 289, 290-93 (1962) (contemplating whether know-how constitutes
property); Richard W. Young, Constitutional Limitations on Government Disclosure of
Private Trade Secret Information, 56 IND. L. J. 347, 350 (1980) (“Trade secret informa-
tion is property.”).
32. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 cmt. b.
33. Id. § 757 cmt. b (“Some factors to be considered in determining whether
given information is one’s trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the information
is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees
and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to
guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and
to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in devel-
oping the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could
be properly acquired or duplicated by others.”).
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Restatement (Second) of Torts.34  Nevertheless, courts continued to cite
to the First Restatement factors after this omission.35
Almost fifty years after the First Restatement was first published, the
National Council of Commissioners of Uniform State Law approved the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) in an attempt to promote increased
uniformity in trade secrets law nationally.36  Although not explicit on the
issue, the UTSA also seemed to embrace a property-based theory of trade
secrets law.37  One major change brought about by the UTSA was the re-
moval of the continuous use requirement of the First Restatement.38  An-
other major change39 was that the UTSA combined the previous two
separate sections of the First Restatement for the protection of informa-
34. See Ed Nowogroski Ins., v. Rucker, 971 P.2d 936, 944 (Wash. 1999); Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, Division Nine, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
35. See, e.g., Advanced Fluid Sys., Inc. v. Huber, 958 F.3d 168, 179 (3d Cir.
2020) (approving of district court’s use of Restatement factors); AirFacts, Inc. v. de
Amezaga, 909 F.3d 84, 95 (4th Cir. 2018), appeal filed, AirFacts, Inc. v. de Amezaga,
Civ. Act. No. DKC 15-1489, 2020 WL 6874313, at *1 (“Before the [Maryland] UTSA
was codified, Maryland applied the Restatement’s factor-based definition of ‘trade
secret,’ which remains useful in a [Maryland] UTSA analysis.”) (quoting Trandes
Corp. v. Guy T. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 661)); Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v.
PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Although the [Illinois
Trade Secrets] Act explicitly defines a trade secret in terms of these two require-
ments, Illinois courts frequently refer to six common law factors (which are de-
rived from § 757 of the Restatement (First) of Torts) in determining whether a
trade secret exists . . . .”).
36. The UTSA was actually the culmination of over a decade of effort prior to
its eventual approval by the Council. See Sandeen, supra note 26, at 520.
37. See Lynn C. Tyler, Trade Secrets in Indiana: Property vs. Relationship, 31 IND.
L. REV. 339, 342 (1998) (proposing that several states’ versions of the UTSA, in-
cluding Indiana, have adopted the “property view” of trade secrets law).
38. The First Restatement distinguished between trade secrets, which were
used continuously in one’s business (in section 757) and general business informa-
tion that did not include the continuous use requirement (in section 759).  The
UTSA did not include this distinction, with the result that trade secrets under the
UTSA could include negative know-how and ephemeral secrets. See Richard E.
Day, Protection of Trade Secrets in South Carolina, 42 S.C. L. REV. 689, 694 (1991);
Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 288 (1980).
For a thorough review of the UTSA drafting and decision-making process, see
Sandeen, supra note 26, at 518–20.  For a discussion of the continuous use require-
ment and the positive and negative consequences of removing it, see Eric R. Cla-
eys, The Use Requirement at Common Law and Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33
HAMLINE L. REV. 583 (2010).
39. Note that these last two points are described as “changes,” but it may be
more accurate to classify them as decisions that were made by the Council between
competing approaches to trade secrets cases around the country.  The use of the
word “change” here is simply to denote changes from the text of the First Restate-
ment, not necessarily changes to the actual law of trade secrets as it existed at the
time.
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tion into a single definition of trade secrets.40  Over the next two decades,
most of the states in the U.S. adopted statutes modeled after the UTSA.41
Based on early criticism, a revised version of the UTSA was issued in
1985, meaning that states that had already adopted a version of the UTSA
were likely to have statutes that were not entirely consistent with the new
version.42  Additionally, each state was free to adopt its own statute that
was as close to, or as far from, the UTSA as the state’s legislators desired,
and so there were significant differences in trade secrets law around the
country.43  Moreover, courts in different states continued to rely on the
First Restatement in their decisions, even when interpreting their state’s
UTSA version, despite that doing so may have been erroneous.44
Independent of the attempt to bring uniformity to trade secrets law
through the UTSA, scholars had been advocating for many years for the
enactment of federal trade secrets law.45  In 1996, on a wave of statistics
and messaging indicating a significant level of industrial espionage, partic-
ularly from foreign actors, the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) was en-
acted, providing for federal criminal enforcement of trade secrets
misappropriation.46  The substantive trade secrets provisions of the EEA
40. See Day, supra note 38, at 694. But see Sandeen, supra note 26, at 528 (sug-
gesting that the drafting and adoption process of the UTSA reflects a rejection of
coverage for the types of information that would have been covered by section 759
of the First Restatement).
41. See Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1657 (1998) (“To date, forty-two [sic] states have enacted the
UTSA.”).
42. See Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K. Johnson, Article, The Uniform Trade Secrets
Act: The States’ Response, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 49 (1990) (examining various states’
UTSA versions, including differences among states adopting prior to the 1985
amendments).
43. See generally Steve Borgman, The Adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act:
How Uniform is Uniform, 27 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 73 (1986) (detailing differences in
various states’ versions of the UTSA and potential impacts of these differences).
44. See Sandeen, supra note 26, at 538.
45. See, e.g., Sandra Wilson Harper, Survival of State Protection for Trade Secrets,
28 ARK. L. REV. 491, 497 (1975) (proposal for federal legislation in view of the
Kewanee decision); Herbert David Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle: A
Survey, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 464-65 (1960) (reviewing trade secrets law and pro-
posal for uniform federal or state law with criminal sanctions); Christopher Rebel
J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 442 (1995)
(proposing federal trade secrets legislation); John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23
OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 30 (1962) (arguing for uniformity in trade secrets law (but not
necessarily federal trade secrets law), including both civil and criminal remedies);
Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 396
(1971) (discussing various challenges with the state of trade secrets law and pro-
posing federal legislation).  When viewed as a species of unfair competition law,
the calls for national uniformity are even earlier. See Sandeen, supra note 26, at
503.
46. For a discussion of the legislative process leading up to enactment of the
EEA, see Gerald J. Mossinghoff, J. Derek Mason & David A. Oblon, The Economic
Espionage Act: A New Federal Regime of Trade Secret Protection, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 191, 192-95 (1997).
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largely paralleled the provisions of the UTSA,47 and thus did not signifi-
cantly change trade secrets doctrine in the U.S.48  Unfortunately, the EEA
did not provide the solution to industrial espionage that some had hoped,
possibly due to the very small number of cases brought under the EEA or
the lack of clarity in the statute itself.49  Accordingly, calls for federal civil
protection of trade secrets continued.50
Following promulgation of the UTSA, and after adoption of some
form of the UTSA by most states, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Com-
petition (“RTUC”) was published and included provisions on trade
secrets.51  By the time of the RTUC, almost all states had adopted the
UTSA and so the RTUC has been less influential in trade secrets cases.52
In fact, even following publication of the RTUC, additional states adopted
a version of the UTSA, rather than relying solely upon the common law, as
reflected in the RTUC.53
Despite this widespread adoption of the UTSA and the inclusion of
trade secrets in the RTUC, fears concerning industrial espionage and a
perceived lack of uniformity in trade secrets law prompted continuing
calls for federal civil legislation on the protection of trade secrets.54  After
47. See Michael Coblenz, Criminal Punishment of Trade Secret Theft Under New
Federal Law: The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 15 IPL NEWSL. 10, 10 (1997) (com-
paring the EEA provisions with the UTSA).
48. Note that at least one commenter raised concerns that the EEA was sub-
ject to constitutionality concerns owing to the vagueness or overbreadth of the
provisions imported from the UTSA. See Robin D. Ryan, Note, The Criminalization
of Trade Secret Theft Under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996: An Evaluation of United
States v. Hsu, 40 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 1999), 25 U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 255
(2000).
49. See, e.g., Lorin L. Reisner, Transforming Trade Secret Theft Violations into Fed-
eral Crimes: The Economic Espionage Act, 15 TOURO L. REV.  139 (1998) (reviewing the
first six cases brought under the EEA); Robert Damion Jurrens, Note, Fool Me Once:
U.S. v. Aleynikov and the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 833, 852 (2013) (proposing that “lack of clarity” in the EEA led to few
prosecutions and convictions); Robin L. Kuntz, Note, How Not to Catch a Thief: Why
the Economic Espionage Act Fails to Protect American Trade Secrets, 28 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 901, 907–09 (2013) (discussing the paucity of cases brought under the EEA,
but suggesting cases may be increasing).
50. See Lao, supra note 41, at 1694; James Pooley, The Top Ten Issues in Trade
Secret Law, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1181, 1188 (1997); Matthew R. Millikin, Note,
WWW.Misappropriation.com: Protecting Trade Secrets After Mass Dissemination on the In-
ternet, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 931, 951 (2000).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (AM. LAW INST.
1995).
52. See Lao, supra note 41.
53. See, e.g., Douglas F. Halijan, The Past, Present, and Future of Trade Secrets Law
in Tennessee: A Practitioner’s Guide Following the Enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (2001) (discussing Tennessee’s UTSA version, en-
acted in 2000).
54. See David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 770 (2009); R. Mark Halligan, Pro-
tection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of
1996, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 656, 656–57 (2008); Kelley Clements
13
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some false starts,55 and no small amount of scholarly criticism,56 the DTSA
was enacted, amending the EEA to include a federal civil cause of action
for trade secrets misappropriation.57  Because the DTSA borrowed heavily
from the UTSA, the effect of the DTSA was largely to simply federalize the
UTSA version of trade secrets law.58  Although worded differently, the re-
quirements for information to be a trade secret under the DTSA are essen-
tially the same as in the UTSA (e.g., reasonable measures/efforts,
independent economic value, and not generally known/readily
ascertainable).
In summary, over the 150 or so years of its development in the U.S.,
overall trade secrets law has evolved from state-by-state common law,
through relatively uniform state statutory law, and ultimately rests as a
Keller & Brian M.Z. Reece, Economic Espionage and Theft of Trade Secrets: The Case for
a Federal Cause of Action, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2013); Alissa
Cardillo, Note, Another Bite at the Apple for Trade Secret Protection: Why Stronger Federal
Laws are Needed to Protect a Corporation’s Most Valuable Property, 10 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 577, 580–81 (2016); Dustin T. Gaines, Comment, Abuse of the Jour-
nalist’s Shield: A State-by-State Survey of Blogger Liability for Trade Secret Misappropriation
and Texas’s Shield Statutes as a Model for Federal Preemption, 7 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 87, 91
(2012); Stephanie Zimmerman, Comment, Secret’s Out: The Ineffectiveness of Current
Trade Secret Law Structure and Protection for Global Health, 29 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV.
777, 790–91 (2011).  This is not to suggest that there were not contrarian voices,
because there were. See Argento, supra note 11; Christopher B. Seaman, The Case
Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 317, 321–22 (2015).
55. See John Cannan, A (Mostly) Legislative History of the Defend Trade Secrets Act
of 2016, 109 L. LIBR. J. 363, 366 (2017) (discussing the legislative efforts leading up
to enactment of the DTSA); R. Mark Halligan, Revisited 2015: Protection of U.S. Trade
Secret Assets: Critical Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 14 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 476, 477 (2015) (discussing attempts to establish civil cause
of action under the EEA prior to the ultimate passage of the DTSA); Sharon K.
Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret
Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 845–53 (2017) (detailing the legislative history of
the DTSA).
56. See David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Open Letter to the Sponsors of
the Revised Defend Trade Secrets Act (August 3, 2015), https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2699763 [https://perma.cc/DMQ9-8Z3L]; see also David S. Levine & Sharon
K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 230,
234–35 (2015) (discussing incentives for dubious litigation created by the pro-
posed DTSA); Seaman, supra note 54, at 321–22 (arguing against a federal trade
secrets law); David S. Levine, School Boy’s Tricks: Reasonable Cybersecurity and the Panic
of Law Creation, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 323, 326 (2015) (arguing that the
proposed DTSA is both under- and over-inclusive in the context of cyberespion-
age); Sharon K. Sandeen, The DTSA: The Litigator’s Full-Employment Act, 72 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. ONLINE 308, 310–13 (2015) (arguing that the proposed DTSA will
increase litigation costs for trade secrets litigants).
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836.
58. There were some differences between the UTSA and DTSA, such as the ex
parte seizure provision. However, other provisions were duplicates. See Sandeen &
Seaman, supra note 55, at 858–59 (noting that many provisions of the DTSA are
identical to the UTSA and discussing how federal courts might interpret provisions
of the DTSA in view of existing UTSA case law).
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combination of relatively uniform state law59 and similarly-worded federal
statutory law.60  Although not uncontroversial, one could see this develop-
ment, along with the accompanying case law, as having moved the balance
between employee rights and employer rights around workplace confiden-
tial/trade secrets information decidedly in favor of employers.61  Rethink-
ing, and adjusting, that balance is one goal of the proposal in this paper.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN THEIR CREATIVE OUTPUTS
This Article is not a theoretical exploration of the origins and justifi-
cations of property rights, personal autonomy, or workers’ rights gener-
ally.  Instead, this Article focuses on tangible justifications that might
support the goal of establishing some rights for employees in their creative
outputs.  Those justifications include employee’s preexisting expectations
or understandings of trade secrets law with respect to their rights in their
own creative outputs and the inequity of using trade secrets law to enforce
overly broad or otherwise unenforceable agreements against employees.
Each of these is discussed in turn.
A. Preexisting Employee Expectations with Respect to Their Own Creative
Outputs May Already Be Out of Step With Existing Trade Secrets
Law
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, employees were increasingly looking
for remote work options62 and employers were, in some circumstances,
already accommodating such requests.63  The trade secrets challenges that
come with remote workers are well-documented.64  In addition, the im-
pact of bring-your-own-device (BYOD) policies and similar technological
issues on firm confidential information has also been discussed.65  None-
59. Note that New York is still a holdout, having not adopted the UTSA. See
TransPerfect Glob., Inc. v. Lionbridge Techs., Inc., No. 19CV3283 (DLC), 2020
WL 1322872, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2020) (“New York has not adopted the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act . . . .”).
60. See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 55, at 904–05.
61. See Argento, supra note 11.
62. See, e.g., BUFFER, State of Remote Work 2019, https://buffer.com/state-of-re-
mote-work-2019 [https://perma.cc/S5HM-YBAW] (last visited June 19, 2021) (re-
porting results of a survey on working remotely).
63. See, e.g., 11 Companies That Let You Work Remotely, GLASSDOOR (Nov. 18,
2019), https://www.glassdoor.com/blog/companies-that-let-you-work-remotely/
[https://perma.cc/Y4HK-C65T] (listing companies that provide remote work op-
tions, based upon employee review information).
64. See, e.g., Linda K. Stevens, Trade Secrets and Inevitable Disclosure, 36 TORT &
INS. L.J. 917, 921 (2001) (discussing the trades secrets challenges posed by the
“virtual office,” including lack of focus on protective measures, difficulty in imple-
menting protective measures, and distributed ownership of hardware).
65. See generally Brian D. Hall, The Impact of Smart and Wearable Technology on
Trade Secret Protection and E-Discovery, 33 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 79 (2017) (discuss-
ing the trade secrets implications of smart, wearable devices in the workplace);
Pedro Pavon, Risky Business: “Bring-Your-Own-Device” and Your Company, BUS. L. TO-
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theless, the global pandemic, and the resulting tectonic shift in remote
working, have made these issues even more relevant.66  Moreover, many
employers are already suggesting that they will not return to the level of in-
person work that they had prior to the pandemic.67
Although not documented in the literature, employees working re-
motely, especially working from home or using their own equipment, may
not be as amenable to the notion that their employer owns all of their
creative outputs, even if they signed an agreement to that effect.  This may
be especially true for those employees who believe that employer owner-
ship of their creative outputs derives primarily from the fact that the em-
ployer provided the infrastructure to support the associated innovation.68
DAY, Sept. 2013, 1 (discussing risks and potential protective measures associated
with the “bring-your-own-device” phenomenon); Robert Williams, Warren Wayne
& Toby Bond, Keeping Your Trade Secrets Safe—Now and in the Future, 243 MANAGING
INTELL. PROP. 52, 54 (2014) (discussing trade secrets concerns associated with
bring-your-own-device and similar technological issues).
66. See, e.g., Yves Barlette, Annabelle Jaouen & Paméla Baillette, Bring Your
Own Device (BYOD) as Reversed IT Adoption: Insights into Managers’ Coping Strategies,
INT’L J. INFO. MGMT., 2021, at 2, 13 (discussing the rise of the ‘bring-your-own-
device’ phenomenon and suggesting pandemics exacerbate the issue); Emily
Courtney, 30 Companies Switching to Long-Term Remote Work, FLEXJOBS https://
www.flexjobs.com/blog/post/companies-switching-remote-work-long-term/
[https://perma.cc/HTM2-PH2K ] (last visited June 19, 2021) (detailing compa-
nies that are planning for long-term remote work); Siobhan Park, Remote Working
Statistics 2021: 15 Exciting Trends, https://remotebliss.com/remote-working-statis-
tics-and-trends/ [https://perma.cc/9LSL-HFN4 ] (last visited June 19, 2021) (col-
lecting various survey data and other reports projecting increases in remote work
options).
67. See, e.g., Kathryn Mayer, Number of the Day: Remote Work After COVID, HUM.
RESOURCES EXECUTIVE (Sept. 14, 2020), https://hrexecutive.com/hres-number-of-
the-day-remote-work-after-covid/ [https://perma.cc/CVU8-SVDX] (reporting sur-
vey results indicating a large number of employers will continue work-from-home
policies after the pandemic); Kristen Senz, How Much Will Remote Work Continue
After the Pandemic, HARV. BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Aug. 24, 2020), https://
hbswk.hbs.edu/item/how-much-will-remote-work-continue-after-the-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/A5QB-KJNL] (reporting results of employer survey indicating
that some jobs will stay remote after the pandemic).
68. It has been argued that one of the justifications for employers owning the
creative outputs of their employees is that the employers provided the infrastruc-
ture (e.g., information technology resources, workspace, raw materials, and the
like) that facilitated the innovation. See Graves, supra note 2, at 80 (proposing
“infrastructural nexus” provided by employer as justification for employer owner-
ship of employee-created trade secrets); see also Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430,
437 (Pa. 1960) (“[T]he developments by change and modification were fruits of
Greenberg’s own skill as a chemist without any appreciable assistance by way of
information or great expense or supervision by Buckingham, outside of the nor-
mal expenses of his job.”).  However, in the information economy, a large portion
of these creative outputs are information and the only infrastructure needed may
be a computer and an internet connection, which the employee may provide
themselves. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Open Borders, Intellectual Property & Federal
Criminal Trade Secret Law, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 24, 33 (2009) (dis-
cussing the role of information in high-mobility markets); Sharon K. Sandeen, Lost
in the Cloud: Information Flows and the Implications of Cloud Computing for Trade Secret
Protection, 19 VA. J.L. & TECH.1, 25 (2014) (discussing the use of cloud infrastruc-
16
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Of course, these remote workers (along with most other workers in the
U.S.) most likely signed a confidentiality and invention assignment agree-
ment when they started their employment.69  Those agreements likely as-
sign all rights in the employee’s creative outputs to the employer,
independent of whether the employee works on-site or remote, but it is
not clear that employees, even in an in-person workplace, accept the valid-
ity of those agreements or feel substantial normative pressure to honor the
agreements to their full extent.70  Accordingly, to the extent trade secrets
law is the vehicle through which these agreements are enforced, employee
expectations regarding their own creative outputs may already run
counter to existing trade secrets law.
In addition, where an employee views the work they are doing for
their employer as simply ordinary, day-to-day work, as opposed to innova-
tive work, the employee probably does not expect that the employer
should be able to prevent the employee from ever using the results of that
work for a future employer or on their own behalf in an entrepreneurial
venture.71  This normative suggestion about employee understanding is
not to imply that employees understand the nuance of trade secrets law
and have concluded that their creative outputs constitute “general skills
and knowledge” as that term is understood in trade secrets cases, which is
almost certainly not the case.  Rather, this is simply how employees view
ture to replace or reduce on-site computing hardware and software).  To the ex-
tent employees believe this infrastructure quid pro quo is accurate, they may not
believe it is appropriate (or enforceable) for employers to own their creative out-
puts, despite what their employment contracts or trade secrets law has to say on the
matter.  On the other hand, they may believe the contracts are valid and enforcea-
ble, but they may not feel normative pressure to honor them. See Sommers, supra
note 14 (detailing individuals’ views about the contracts they enter); see Yuval Feld-
man, Article, Experimental Approach to the Study of Normative Failures: Divulging of
Trade Secrets by Silicon Valley Employees, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 105, 114
(2003) (discussing high-mobility cultural impacts on employee views on trade
secrets).  Moreover, when the agreement itself contains a provision along the lines
of “aided by the use of time, materials, facilities or information paid for or pro-
vided by the Corporation,” the employee may believe that this provision prevents
the enforcement of the agreement against them when in fact it may not.  Sac-
comanno v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 2010 WL 1329038, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Apr. 7, 2010).
69. See supra note 10.
70. See Yuval Feldman, supra note 4, at 224 (report and analysis of empirical
study on employee attitudes toward disclosure of trade secrets after changing em-
ployment); Feldman, supra note 68.
71. As an example, see the discussion here: Is It Wrong to Take Code You Have
Produced at Work and Re-use It for Personal Projects?, STACK EXCHANGE (Oct. 7, 2011,
1:17 PM), https://softwareengineering.stackexchange.com/questions/112953/is-
it-wrong-to-take-code-you-have-produced-at-work-and-re-use-it-for-personal-pr?an
swertab=votes#tab-top [https://perma.cc/4D5F-WB3Z].  Many responders to a
question about whether an employee could reuse code from previous employment
believed the answer is no, while others believed it depends on the type of code, the
function of the code, and how similar the projects are. Id.
17
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the equities in the modern workplace.72  In fact, despite having signed
agreements at the time of employment assigning all of their creative out-
puts to their employer, many employees would likely be surprised to learn
that such contracts are enforceable through trade secrets law rather than
through contracts law.73  Although it is not necessary that the law gener-
ally agree with impacted persons’ normative expectations, one could
hardly expect departing employees to be cognizant of or conform their
conduct to a legal regime that is not consistent with their expectations.
Accordingly, a modification to trade secrets law to recognize some rights
of employees in their own creative outputs may be consistent with em-
ployee expectations as they already exist.
B. Trade Secrets Law Should Not Be the Vehicle to Enforce Overly Broad
Employment Agreements
As it stands now, confidentiality and invention assignment agreements
are the vehicles through which employers obtain rights in an employee’s
creative outputs and place restrictions on the employee’s use of those out-
puts after the employment ends.74  The provisions in these agreements are
72. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001); see
also Stone, supra note 9, at 722 (2002) (“[E]mployees assume that the skills and
knowledge they acquire on a particular job ‘belong’ to them in the sense that they
take these with them when they depart.”).
73. The worst-case scenario for the employee is the case of inevitable disclo-
sure, where an employee can be held liable for trade secrets misappropriation in
the absence of any actual or threatened misappropriation, simply because of the
information they carry in their memory.  The notions underpinning the inevitable
disclosure doctrine may be as old as the nineteenth century. See, e.g., O. & W.
Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 72 N.W. 140 (Mich. 1897).  The doctrine gained signifi-
cant prominence from the PepsiCo decision. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d
1262 (7th Cir. 1995).  After enactment of the DTSA, there was a question as to
whether federal trade secrets law would import the inevitable disclosure doctrine
from state law. See M. Claire Flowers, Note, Facing the Inevitable: The Inevitable Disclo-
sure Doctrine and the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2207,
2212 (2018).  However, recently at least one court seems to have answered this
question in the affirmative. See Packaging Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Croner, 419 F.
Supp. 3d 1059, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (analyzing inevitable disclosure in a DTSA
claim but ultimately finding that plaintiff did not meet its burden to establish inevi-
table disclosure); see also Acteon, Inc. v. Harms, No. 1:20-cv-14851-NLH-AMD, 2020
WL 6694411, at *9 (D. N.J. Nov. 6, 2020) (finding likelihood of success on inevita-
ble disclosure claim based on New Jersey law and DTSA, but not separately analyz-
ing the DTSA).  Accordingly, employees may be surprised to learn that simply
retaining their creative outputs in memory when changing employers could lead
to federal trade secrets liability.
74. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Morin, 731 S.E.2d 288 (S.C. 2012).  Invention
assignment provision states:
With respect to Inventions made, authored and conceived by me, either
solely or jointly with others . . . I will . . . [a]ssign (and I do hereby assign)
to [employer] all of my rights to such Inventions, and to applications for
letters patent, copyright registrations and/or mask work registrations in
all countries . . . .
Id. at 290.  Definition of “inventions” states:
18
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then used to establish some of the elements of a trade secrets misappropri-
ation claim, including ownership of the trade secrets at issue and reasona-
ble efforts to protect the trade secrets.  However, these provisions are
drafted so broadly that they purport to cover all information, including an
employee’s routine creative outputs.75  Consequently, an employee cannot
know in advance what the scope of their trade secrets liability might be.
Moreover, if the employee actually reads the agreement,76 they may per-
ceive that they are bound to a broad restriction that may not, in practice,
be enforceable.77  Such broad restrictions might be reasonable with re-
spect to information the employee learns from the employment, but they
INVENTIONS means discoveries, improvements and ideas (whether or
not shown or described in writing or reduced to practice), mask works
(topography or semiconductor chips) and works of authorship, whether
or not patentable, copyrightable or registerable, (1) which relate directly
to the business of [employer], or (2) which relate to [employer]’s actual
or demonstrably anticipated research or development, or (3) which re-
sult from any work performed by me for [employer], or (4) for which any
equipment, supplies, facility or Trade Secret or Confidential Information
of [employer] is used, or (5) which is developed on any [employer] time.
Id.; see also NovelAire Techs., LLC v. Harrison, 50 So. 3d 913, 915 (La. Ct. App.).
Invention assignment provision states:
Any and all inventions, discoveries and improvements which Employee
has conceived or made, and/or may conceive or make, during the period
of his said employment, relating to employer’s business or arising out of
or resulting from his said employment, shall be the sole and exclusive
property of Employer or its nominee.
Id.; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879 (N.J. 1988).  Invention assignment
provision states:
I hereby do assign, to the COMPANY . . . my entire right, title and interest
in and to all inventions, copyrights and/or designs I have made or may
hereafter make, conceive, develop or perfect, either solely or jointly with
others either (a) during the period of such employment, if such inven-
tions, copyrights and/or designs are related, directly or indirectly, to the
business of, or to the research or development work of the COMPANY or
its affiliates, or (b) with the use of the time, materials or facilities of the
COMPANY or any of its affiliates . . . .
Id. at 882; Saccomanno v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 2010 WL 1329038 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Apr. 7, 2010).  Invention assignment provision states:
I hereby assign and agree to assign, without further compensation, to
[employer] . . . my entire right, title and interest in and to each inven-
tion, technological innovation and copyrightable work . . . which, I either
individually or jointly with others, conceive, develop or create during the period
of my employment, whether or not during working hours, and which either
(a) is within the scope of the Corporation’s business or investigations to which
my employment relates or gives me access, or (b) is aided by the use of time,
materials, facilities or information paid for or provided by the Corporation, . . . I
agree to disclose promptly to the Corporation each such invention, inno-
vation and copyrightable work . . . .
Id. at *1.
75. See id. at *1.
76. But see Sommers, supra note 14, at 1 (indicating individuals do not read
agreements presented to them in the consumer context).
77. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1941).
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may not be reasonable when they are applied to all of an employee’s crea-
tive outputs, irrespective of the level of innovation involved.
Brown v. TGS Management78 is instructive on the issue of over-
breadth.79  In Brown, a former employee brought a declaratory judgment
action attacking the validity of the employment agreement he signed “[a]s
a condition of employment.”80  The employee’s complaint “alleged the
confidentiality provisions were ‘overbroad, vague and ambiguous,’ and
sought a declaration which ‘would enable him to practice his profession of
statistical arbitrage without being subjected to unfounded claims that he
has used TGS’ “trade secrets” and “confidential information.”’”81  In re-
viewing the twelve-page confidentiality agreement, the court found the fol-
lowing provisions problematic:
• The definition of confidential information as “information, in
whatever form, used or usable in, or originated, developed or
acquired for use in, or about or relating to, the Business.’
‘The Business,’ in turn, is defined to include ‘without limita-
tion analyzing, executing, trading and/or hedging in securi-
ties and financial instruments and derivatives thereon,
securities-related research, and trade processing and related
administration . . . .82
• “[T]he employee’s duty to ‘keep all Confidential Information
in strictest confidence and trust’ during and after employ-
ment with TGS.”83
• The invention assignment provision, which “prohibits the em-
ployee from disclosing at any time, during or after employ-
ment with TGS, to anyone other than TGS or its clients, or
using for the benefit of anyone other than TGS or its clients,
the employee’s ‘Inventions,’ defined as including ‘concepts,
ideas, improvements, . . . strategies, methods, systems, know-
how. . . .”84
• Two exceptions to the definition of “Confidential Informa-
tion,” by excepting “‘information which is or becomes gener-
ally known in the securities industry through legal means
without fault by’ Brown”85 and “information which ‘was
known by Employee on a non-confidential basis prior to his
78. 271 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020), as modified on denial of reh’g
(Nov. 12, 2020), review filed (Dec. 21, 2020).
79. See id.
80. Id. at 306.
81. Id. at 309.
82. Id. at 316.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 316 n.4.
85. Id. at 317.
20
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initial engagement or employment by Employer, as evidenced
by Employee’s written records.’”86
The court determined that “the confidentiality provisions [were] void ab
initio and unenforceable”87 because they “severely restrict[ed] Brown’s
right to work in clear contravention of [California Code] section 16600.”88
The most troubling part of the Brown decision is that the court goes on to
state that, despite the overbreadth of the confidentiality terms and the fact
that they essentially precluded the former employee from working in his
chosen field, the employer could seek to enforce the terms through a
trade secrets claim.89
The Brown decision is specific to California law because California has
a statutory prohibition on non-compete agreements.90  Accordingly, the
decision is not generalizable to all jurisdictions (although it may be of
particular interest to employers in California).  Nevertheless, there are
three important points that may make the principles in Brown applicable
more broadly.  First, the broad terms in this agreement were not atypical
of employee confidentiality agreements that have been litigated in other
jurisdictions.91  Thus, the issues of overbreadth discussed in Brown may be
86. Id.  The court went on to state, “Brown points out the absurdity of this
exception: ‘In other words, securities-related information that was not confidential
before Brown’s employment with TGS metamorphoses into TGS’s “Confidential
Information” unless Brown has written records proving his prior knowledge of the
information.’” Id.
87. Id. at 319 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 320.
89. Id. at 317.  However, the interesting result here is that the court found the
confidentiality provisions, including the invention assignment, to be “void ab initio”
and so it does not seem that the employer could bring a trade secrets claim alleg-
ing misappropriation of the employee’s own creative outputs, at least not on the
basis of the employer’s rights in those outputs through the confidentiality
agreement.
90. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1941) (“[E]very contract by
which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business
of any kind is to that extent void”).
91. See, e.g., Box v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 533 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Ark. Ct. App.
2017) (covering “information concerning Company methods, processes, opera-
tions, marketing programs, computer programs, future plans and customers, and
other proprietary or otherwise sensitive information.”); Giftango, LLC v. Rosen-
berg, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1132 (D. Or. 2013) (defining confidential information
in the employee agreement as “data that has been researched, compiled, devel-
oped and/or maintained by Company . . . and which is not generally known within
the industry.  Confidential Information includes, but is not limited to, trade
secrets, information, ideas, knowledge, data, or know-how related to products,
processes, software, designs, formulae, tests, research, business and/or marketing
plans and strategies, costs, profits, pricing, personnel and financial information,
capitalization and other corporate data and information, and information about
or obtained from customers, authors, suppliers, consultants, licensees, or affili-
ates.”); Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916–17 (D. Nev. 2006)
(including in an employee confidentiality agreement, “any information, manufac-
turing technique, process, formula, development [or] experimental work, work in
process, business, trade secret, or any other secret or confidential matter relating
21
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applicable in other jurisdictions and other courts may similarly find that
these overbroad provisions act as a non-compete provision.  Second, other
courts around the country require non-competes to be reasonable in
time.92  To the extent these employee confidentiality agreements have no
time restriction on the use of confidential information, enforcement of
these overbroad provisions can act as a perpetual non-compete.  Thus,
even in jurisdictions that do not have statutes like California’s, as long as
non-compete restrictions are evaluated for reasonableness in duration,
overbroad provisions could be struck down.  Finally, other jurisdictions
around the country are considering, or have considered, legislation to ban
or restrict non-compete agreements.93  Accordingly, if more jurisdictions
enact legislation similar to California’s statute, the analysis in Brown may
be instructive of how such claims would fair in those jurisdictions as well.
Because employees are required to sign broad confidentiality and in-
vention assignment agreements as conditions of employment and the
agreements place ambiguous or unenforceable restrictions on the employ-
ees, these agreements should not form the basis of trade secrets claims for
an employee’s own creative outputs.  In other words, trade secrets law
should not provide the vehicle through which otherwise unenforceable
agreements (because of their anti-competitive effects) are enforced
against departing employees, particularly with respect to the employee’s
own creative outputs.  Instead, employees should be free to take their own
creative outputs with them when they leave employment (but not necessa-
rily information they learned from others during employment) and trade
secrets law should not be the vehicle through which employers prevent
this result.
to the products, sales, or business of [employer] or its affiliates or subsidiaries ex-
cept as such disclosure or use may be required in connection with [employee’s]
work for [employer].”); Syndicated Servs., Inc. v. Yarbrough, No. 16 CVS 20912,
2017 WL 663515, at *2 (N.C. Super. Feb. 15, 2017) (defining “Confidential Infor-
mation” in an employee agreement as “all non-public information designated as
being confidential or which, under the circumstances surrounding disclosure,
ought to be treated as confidential, as well as any derivatives thereof, including but
not limited to . . . all information oral, written or otherwise exchanged between the
parties hereto concerning [the potential business relationship between the Par-
ties], including but not limited to financial information, development plans, mar-
keting plan, business opportunities, personnel, and research.”).
92. See Sharon K. Sandeen & Elizabeth A. Rowe, Debating Employee Non-Com-
petes and Trade Secrets, 33 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 438, 448
(2017) (discussing the reasonableness inquiry in non-compete disputes with one of
the factors being the duration of the non-compete restriction).
93. See id. at 449 (discussing state-level efforts around the country to legisla-
tively address non-compete agreements).
22
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III. RECOGNIZING AN EMPLOYEE’S OWN CREATIVE OUTPUTS AS GENERAL
SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE IS THE MOST REASONABLE PATH TO
ACCOMPLISHING THE GOAL
The goal of this Article is to establish, at least to some extent, em-
ployee rights in their own creative outputs from a trade secrets law per-
spective.  To accomplish that goal, this Article proposes that the most
reasonable approach is recognizing that an employee’s creative outputs
constitute their general skills and knowledge.  To demonstrate why that is
so, this Section will first walk through the background of the general skills
and knowledge exclusion and then discuss the actual proposal in more
concrete terms.
A. General Skills and Knowledge Background
Beginning with the earliest cases, trade secrets law largely developed
to deal with the situation where an employee leaves an employer and takes
some information with them, either tangibly or in memory.94  In early
cases, courts wrestled with the issue of what to do about employee-created
inventions that are subsequently taken by the employee to a competing
firm or for the employee’s own benefit.95  In early cases, it was not even
clear whether employee inventions became trade secrets of their employ-
94. See, e.g., Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 F. 401, 407 (W.D. Mich.
1908) (recognizing an obligation by employees to protect employer trade secrets,
but finding the information at issue not to be a trade secret); Schulenburg v. Sig-
natrol, Inc., 212 N.E.2d 865, 869 (Ill. 1965) (“It should, moreover, make no differ-
ence whether the information contained in the blueprints, if it qualified as a trade
secret (which in our judgment it does), has been pilfered by tracing the blueprints
themselves, as some testimony herein indicates, or has been memorized by some-
one with a photographic memory, or has been committed to memory by constant
exposure to the prints while in the employ of plaintiffs.”); O. & W. Thum Co. v.
Tloczynski, 72 N.W. 140 (Mich. 1897) (affirming injunction against departing em-
ployee); Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154, 158
(1887) (“[I]f there was a secret, as I have found probable, and he came to know it
because he was foreman and had to know it that it might be used, and knew that it
was a secret, then I am inclined to think that his obligation to preserve such secret
as the property of his employer must be implied, even though nothing was said to
him on the subject.”).
95. See, e.g., Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 23 Cal. Rptr. 198, 209 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1962) (distinguishing cases where an employer discloses a trade secret to
an employee from cases where the employee developed the trade secrets them-
selves); Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S. 110, 116 (N.Y. App. Div. 1892) (hold-
ing former employees liable for misappropriation despite that they contributed to
the innovations at issue); see also Stephen J. Davidson & Robert L. DeMay, Applica-
tion of Trade Secret Law to New Technology—Unwinding the Tangled Web, 12 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 579 (1986); Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets,
Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Prop-
erty, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2001); Douglas S. Liebhafsky, Industrial Se-
cret and the Skilled Employee, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 324 (1963); Henry H. Snelling, The
Rights of an Inventor-Employee, 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 410 (1940); Trade Secrets. Trade
Secret Developed by Employee in the Course of Authorized Research May Be Used in Compet-
ing with Former Employer. Wexler v. Greenberg (Pa. 1960), 74 HARV. L. REV. 1473
(1961).
23
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ers and could therefore form the basis for a misappropriation claim.96
Even though widespread use of employee confidentiality and invention
assignment agreements has largely mooted the issue,97 modern courts also
wrestle with the problem of ownership over employee-created trade secrets
from time to time.98
Against this backdrop of uncertainty around departing employees’
rights in their own creative outputs (and workplace-related information
generally), courts began to develop the general skills and knowledge ex-
clusion.99  Despite having its roots in early trade secrets law, the exclusion
was not included in the First Restatement.100  Nevertheless, the exclusion
continued to develop in the common law.101  Over time, courts came to
distinguish employer trade secrets, which could not be taken with an em-
ployee when they depart, and employee general skills and knowledge that
96. See, e.g., Nat’l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 13 Ohio C.D. 468, 473 (Ohio Ct. App.
1902) (suggesting employee inventions do not become trade secrets of the em-
ployer absent a “contract to that effect”); Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel
Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 475 (1904) (suggesting employee inventions do become
trade secrets of the employer, even in the absence of a contract to that effect); see
also Newman, supra note 11, at 16–21 (offering historical review of employer own-
ership of employee-created inventions).
97. See Fisk, supra note 5, at 1181 (discussing the historical development lead-
ing up to and including large-scale use of employee invention assignment
agreements).
98. See, e.g., N. Elec. Co. v. Torma, 819 N.E.2d 417, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
(reversing lower court’s determination that an employee owned the data compila-
tions at issue because the compilations arose out of the employee’s assigned du-
ties); Pullman Grp., LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 288 A.D.2d 2, 3 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001) (affirming motion to dismiss based on employer ownership of employee
inventions).
99. See Hamilton Mfg., 216 F. at 407 (holding that information known by other
companies in the industry could not be a trade secret).  There is not one universal
name for referring to an employee’s general, skills, knowledge, experience, etc.
See Hrdy, supra note 17, at 2419 n. 68.  This Article refers simply to “general skills
and knowledge,” even though courts and commenters may use a different term.
Professor Camilla Hrdy provides a well-reasoned and compelling argument that
general skills and knowledge should be considered an “exclusion” (as opposed to a
subject matter bar). Id. at 2446.  While other options are possible (for example,
defense, immunity, implied license, fair use, and the like), none of these are a
perfect fit for the doctrine, and in some cases (like defense) are no fit at all.  Ac-
cordingly, this Article follows Professor Hrdy’s lead and uses the exclusion
approach.
100. See Hrdy, supra note 17, at 2426 (“[T]he First Restatement does not pro-
vide an explicit statement of the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience
Exclusion.”).
101. See, e.g., Rem Metals Corp. v. Logan, 565 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Or. 1977) (“It
has been uniformly held that general knowledge, skill, or facility acquired through train-
ing or experience while working for an employer appertain exclusively to the employee.” (quot-
ing Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 652
(1960))); Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 212 N.E.2d 865, 869 (Ill. 1965) (“It is
clear that an employee may take with him, at the termination of his employment,
general skills and knowledge acquired during his tenure with the former
employer.”).
24
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departing employees could take with them.102  The exact scope of these
two categories has never been fully resolved, however.103  Interestingly,
the distinction does not necessarily turn on whether the taken information
is taken in tangible form or only in memory.104  Eventually, unlike the
First Restatement, the RTUC did include a description of the exclusion105,
but as discussed above, the impact of the RTUC has not been significant to
date.106  Accordingly, the exclusion remains today a product of the com-
mon law whose reach may extend to particular information an employee
creates or learns during their employment, but the full extent of that
reach is uncertain.  Despite its lengthy history, the full scope of the gen-
eral skills and knowledge exclusion remains ambiguous.  The proposal in
this Article will not resolve that ambiguity for information not created by a
particular departing employee, but it would resolve any ambiguity around
the employee’s own creative outputs.
B. The General Skills and Knowledge Proposal
The proposal in this Article is that, from a trade secrets perspective,
employees should be free to retain the fruits of their creative output when
leaving their employment; in other words, an employee’s creative outputs
102. See Hrdy, supra note 17, at 2419 (discussing the historical development of
the general skills and knowledge “exclusion”).
103. See, e.g., Miles Feldman, supra note 4, at 165 (reviewing cases distinguish-
ing between “know how” and “general knowledge and skill”); Letty S. Friesen, Dis-
tinguishing Between an Employee’s General Knowledge and Trade Secrets, 23 COLO. LAW.
2123 (1994) (discussing factors courts look to in distinguishing between trade
secrets and general skills and knowledge); Kurt M. Saunders & Nina Golden, Skill
Or Secret?—The Line Between Trade Secrets and Employee General Skills and Knowledge, 15
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 61 (2018) (discussing the distinction between trade secrets and
general skills and knowledge).  For a proposed framework of how courts might
apply the exclusion, see Hrdy, supra note 17, at 2464.
104. See, e.g., Randall Scott Hetrick, Employee “Head Knowledge” and the Alabama
Trade Secrets Act, 47 ALA. L. REV. 513, 533–36 (1996) (discussing whether the dis-
tinction between remembered information and taken documents continues to ex-
ist in Alabama after passage of UTSA version); Liebhafsky, supra note 95, at 343
(discussing the possibility of the “memory doctrine” applicable to customer lists
might be extended to “industrial know-how”). See generally Yuval Feldman, supra
note 4, at 200–03 (discussing results of empirical study directed to learned/devel-
oped and downloaded/memorized distinctions). But see Fleming Sales Co. v. Bai-
ley, 611 F. Supp. 507, 514 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (discussing general skills and knowledge
as “[t]hose are things an employee is free to take and to use in later pursuits,
especially if they do not take the form of written records, compilations or analyses”
(citing MBL (USA) Corp. v. Diekman, 445 N.E.2d 418, 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983))).
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 (AM. LAW INST.
1995) (“Information that forms the general skill, knowledge, training, and experi-
ence of an employee cannot be claimed as a trade secret by a former employer
even when the information is directly attributable to an investment of resources by
the employer in the employee.”).
106. The author has not located any published opinions in which a court dis-
cussed this particular provision of the RTUC other than in passing and only one
unpublished decision. See Booth Waltz Enter. v. Kimlingen, No. CV040072045S,
2004 WL 2287777, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 2004).
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during their employment should be considered their general skills and
knowledge for purposes of trade secrets misappropriation claims.107  Fol-
lowing from this proposal is the notion that, again from a trade secrets
perspective, it does not matter whether the employee takes such creative
outputs with them in memory, tangible form, or electronic form (al-
though, as discussed below, these things may matter for other statutes or
causes of action).  To be clear, the proposal is not to establish some type of
formal ownership in which the property rights in an innovation, as be-
tween the employee, the employer, and other employees, are all assigned
and validated.108  Instead, the proposal is simply that an employee’s own
creative outputs cannot form the basis for a trade secrets misappropriation
claim because they constitute general skills and knowledge, which under
the exclusion, cannot be actionable trade secrets.109
The proposal does not go further and suggest that the employee has
an ownership interest in any resulting registered intellectual property,
outside of some agreement between the employer and employee or some
underlying legal construct that establishes such ownership.110  Moreover,
the fact that an employee can take the innovation with them does not
mean that the employer loses any rights it has to continue to use the inno-
vation at its discretion111 or to bring a trade secrets misappropriation
claim against other employees or firms if the facts warrant.112  Finally, the
proposal is not that general skills and knowledge be confined solely to the
creative outputs of the employee.  Rather, the proposal is for a modifica-
tion to the traditionally recognized scope of general skills and knowl-
107. The author acknowledges that the proposal requires jurisdiction-by-juris-
diction modification of existing trade secrets law.  However, in the case of common
law, courts may be inclined to look to interpretations in other jurisdictions as in-
formative of cases before them and so adoption of the proposal in a few jurisdic-
tions could lead to more widespread adoption nationally.
108. Scholars have already made proposals along these lines, but none have
been, to this author’s knowledge, implemented by any courts or legislators. See
Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work: New Metaphors for the New Economy, 80 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 839, 862–63 (2005); Newman, supra note 11.  For a detailed discussion of
employee invention assignment agreements from both property and personhood
perspectives, see Steven Cherensky, Comment, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-
Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CALIF. L.
REV. 595, 598–601 (1993).
109. See Hrdy, supra note 17, at 2426.
110. See supra Section IV.B.
111. In other words, the proposal does not depend on application of the
Shop Right or other similar equitable measures to establish the employer’s right to
continue using the innovative outputs of its employees.  Instead, the employer sim-
ply may not have an exclusive right in those creative outputs (unless the employer
formalizes such exclusive rights by registering the associated IP). See id.
112. The proposal does not extinguish an employer’s rights in their trade
secrets because the employer still owns the trade secret at issue (at least until it
becomes disclosed publicly).  Instead, the employer is simply prevented from as-
serting a misappropriation claim against the particular employee that created the
information at issue.
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edge113 to include the employee’s own creative outputs, to the extent they
were not already covered under the traditional exclusion.114
IV. PRACTICAL IMPACTS OF THE PROPOSAL
As discussed above in Part III, the proposal is a departure from trade
secrets law as it exists today.  Accordingly, adoption of the proposal could
be expected to impact the way both employers and employees conduct
themselves moving forward.  This Section walks through some of the prac-
tical impacts the proposal might have for employers and employees.115
A. The Proposal Means That Employees Can Take Their Creative Outputs in
(Almost) Any Form
The practical aspects of the proposal with respect to employees taking
their creative outputs with them may not be inherently intuitive.  In this
113. Because this concept is not statutory, its exact scope is open to debate
and may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Moreover, it’s not clear that courts
routinely apply the exclusion correctly. See Hrdy, supra note 17, at 2415.
114. Certainly, in some cases, a trade secrets defendant’s general skills and
knowledge assertion have been premised on their own creative outputs. See, e.g.,
Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Eng’g Mechs. Research Corp., 401 F. Supp.
1102, 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (reviewing different approaches to address em-
ployee-created trade secrets).  However, this is not a requirement of the exclusion
(although some cases could be seen as imposing such a requirement). See Hrdy,
supra note 17, at 2457.  Moreover, under current law, the employee cannot know
in advance whether their creative outputs are transferrable or not.  Consequently,
a risk-averse employee’s best option is to not take any information with them.  This
result obviously works to the benefit of former employers, but it hinders departing
employees in their ability to use their full skills, knowledge, and experience at
subsequent employers.
115. One potential impact not discussed here is the impact on incentives to
innovate.  One of the primary justifications for trade secrets law is that it encour-
ages firms to innovate. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482
(1974).  As the story goes, in the absence of a protective regime (other than pat-
ents and copyrights), firms will not invest in R&D because they are unlikely to
recoup the costs of that R&D if a competitor can simply obtain the fruits of that
research and exploit it directly. See Chiappetta, supra note 29, at 86 (discussing the
incentive to innovate justification for trade secrets law); Ekaterina G. Long, The
Law of Intangible Assets: The Philosophical Underpinnings of Trade Secret Law in the
United States, 19 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 125, 125 (2016) (discussing adverse
results if trade secrets protection is not provided for firm information); Michael
Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 38 (2007)
(discussing economic justifications for trade secrets law).  Assuming this “incentive
to innovate” theory is valid, the proposal in this Article could lead to reduced inno-
vation by firms. But see Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 575, 578 (1999) (suggesting that statutorily restricted enforcement of cove-
nants not to compete increases knowledge transfer among firms and thus contrib-
utes to the success of the Silicon Valley innovation ecosystem contrasted with an
area with stronger enforcement of such covenants); Michael P. Simpson, The Future
of Innovation: Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and Protectionism—An Age-Old Tale, 70
BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1144 (2005) (arguing that incentives to innovate rationale is
“unconvincing”).
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respect, the proposal leads to the straight-forward question of in what ways
employees can exercise these rights in their creative outputs, or more spe-
cifically, in what ways can departing employees retain their creative out-
puts when departing an employer?  This Section addresses that question.
If the proposal were adopted, the employee’s ability to take their crea-
tive outputs in any form would follow automatically because the informa-
tion the employee takes cannot be the basis of a misappropriation claim
against them.116  Accordingly, the mode of removal of the information is
irrelevant from a trade secrets perspective.  In other words, if the em-
ployee is a software programmer, leaving with the code they generated in
electronic form (e.g., email, USB drive, cloud storage, and the like) would
be permissible.117
Again, this result is confined to the trade secrets cause of action and
would not displace laws regulating ordinary theft.  Indeed, if an employee
left with significant physical assets, the employer would be free to take
action under a physical theft statute.118  However, that scenario seems un-
likely because it should not normally be necessary for an employee to re-
116. This is one reason, in the author’s view, that the general skills and knowl-
edge proposal is a more appropriate way to address the goal than, for example,
modifying the definition of “improper means.”  Using this approach, the employee
is free to use any means to retain their creative outputs without trade secrets liabil-
ity (although other liability may attach to their conduct, as described in other sec-
tions of this Article).  If the “improper means” approach were pursued, legislators
and courts are likely going to be hesitant to overlook illegal conduct in acquiring
information that is established as a trade secret.  Thus, the “improper means” ap-
proach could significantly curtail the extent to which the goal is accomplished, if
that approach were taken.
117. In the modern workplace where work product is largely created in elec-
tronic form, on firm hardware or employee-owned hardware, some form of elec-
tronic transfer—either through physical media or cloud service—would be the
most likely avenue for retaining creative outputs.  However, in some circum-
stances, physical objects might be the most appropriate mechanism for retention.
One additional way in which employers could blunt the impact of the proposal
would be to use countermeasures to prevent employee retention of their creative
outputs.  On the physical side, such countermeasures could include having pass-
word-protected or job-verifying copy machines.  On the electronic side, such coun-
termeasures could include using software that prevents the use of USB storage
devices on any firm hardware or blocking access to all file transfer services or web-
sites.  The question of whether this is permissible is not directly raised by the pro-
posal because the proposal essentially provides an immunity from a trade secrets
claim, not an affirmative right against the employer.  However, this is an issue
worth further consideration if the goal is to establish substantive rights in em-
ployee creative outputs, rather than just an immunity from suit.
118. But see Arthur G. III Connelly, Theft of Trade Secrets, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
721, 723 (1987) (discussing the challenges of trying to address trade secrets theft
through general criminal statutes); Fetterley, supra note 18 (providing historical
review of the challenges with general criminal enforcement against trade secrets
misappropriations that led to enactment of criminal laws specific to trade secrets);
Peter J.G. Toren, The Prosecution of Trade Secrets Thefts under Federal Law, 22 PEPP. L.
REV. 59, 60–62 (1994) (discussing the challenges posed by modern technology to
addressing trade secrets theft).
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move substantial physical items in order to leave with their creative
outputs.119
Because the proposal precludes a misappropriation claim against a
departing employee, the employee is free to leave with their creative out-
puts in any reasonable form, subject only to other, non-trade-secrets
causes of action.  Accordingly, in a misappropriation claim against a de-
parting employee, the principal question is whether the taken information
constitutes the employee’s own creative outputs and only if it is not, the
mode of removal can then be evaluated to determine whether improper
means was used to acquire the information.  Thus, the method of removal
of the information only becomes relevant once it is determined that the
information does not constitute the employee’s own creative outputs.
B. Employers Retain Ownership of Any Registered IP That Flows from Their
Employees’ Creative Outputs
One important consideration in evaluating the proposal is to distin-
guish between trade secrets and confidential information on the one hand
(i.e., non-registered IP), and patented, trademarked, and copyrighted in-
novation on the other (hereto referred to as “registered IP”).120  As con-
templated in this Article, the ownership of registered IP is not impacted by
the proposal and is, instead, left to other existing legal regimes, such as
contracts law, intellectual property law, and agency law.  In other words,
the proposal does not seek to change the ownership of registered IP as it is
currently determined under existing law.  This result flows naturally from
the fact that the proposal is implemented through the general skills and
knowledge exclusion, rather than some other formal ownership construct.
To see how this works in practice, each of patents, copyrights, and trade
secrets are discussed in turn.
1. The Proposal Does Not Impact Employers’ Patent Rights
Patents probably represent an easier case conceptually for recogniz-
ing the delineation of what respective rights the employer and the em-
ployee have in particular employee creative outputs under the proposal.
Because the proposal does not impact ownership (e.g., override existing
contractual relationships or property rights established by common law),
employers are free to file patent applications on employee inventions just
119. Much more likely would be the use of a USB drive or some other de
minimis physical asset.
120. Note that “registered IP” is being used in a general sense to capture both
officially registered IP (e.g., issued patents, registered copyrights, registered trade-
marks) and those types of IP that are registrable, even if no formal registration has
been applied for or issued.  The employer’s rights in registered IP, as the term is
used here, may be impacted depending on whether and when the employer actu-
ally pursues a registration or the registration issues, particularly in the copyright
context.
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as they do now.  With respect to any inventions for which the employer
files a patent application, the proposal has no impact.
Specifically, if the employer files a patent application for a particular
invention, the employee has limited risk under existing law of a misappro-
priation claim for taking the associated information with them when they
depart.  This is the case independent of whether the patent actually issues
to the employer, but the employee’s ability to use the information will
obviously be dependent on whether a patent issues.  In the case that the
patent does not issue and is ultimately abandoned, the information is no
longer a trade secret once the patent application publishes.121  Thus, the
departing employee cannot misappropriate that information (because, as
publicly available information, it will not meet the definition of a trade
secret, independent of the proposal in this Article).  On the other hand, if
the patent does issue, again the employee cannot misappropriate the in-
formation (because the information is public as of the earlier of publica-
tion or issuance).  However, if the employee (or their later employer) uses
the information, they could be subject to a patent infringement claim.
Because patent infringement claims do not have the same requirements
that trade secrets claims have, there is no need for courts to inquire into
the circumstances that gave rise to the infringement or investigate whether
reasonable efforts were undertaken to protect anything or whether im-
proper means were used to learn the information.  In other words, the
departing employee or new employer’s product, process, etc. is either in-
fringing or it is not.122
Accordingly, with respect to patentable creative outputs, the proposal
only affects inventions for which the employer does not file a patent appli-
cation.  In other words, the employer’s exclusive rights in patentable in-
ventions are limited to those for which the employer files a patent
application because trade secrets law would have no further applicability
to those inventions123 and the employee would be free to take those crea-
121. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2018) (“[E]ach application for a patent shall be pub-
lished . . . promptly after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest
filing date . . . .”).
122. Note that, for purposes of this discussion, willful infringement is not be-
ing addressed, which were it to be raised in a particular case, could include a sub-
jective analysis of the infringer’s conduct. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016) (establishing a subjective test to determine if an in-
fringer’s conduct should give rise to enhanced damages).
123. One caveat here is that a particular patent may not detail the full scope
of a particular innovation or claim that full scope.  Not claiming the full scope is
not an issue for purposes of this discussion because once the patent issues or pub-
lishes, any information described in the patent or its application becomes public
and cannot be a trade secret.  However, an undisclosed related innovation could
be a concern for employers because this undisclosed innovation would be subject
to the proposal here.  Patent applicants’ incentives to disclose this related innova-
tion were reduced with the passage of the America Invents Act, which softened the
best mode requirement. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2018) (“The following shall be
defenses in any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent and shall
be pleaded . . . Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply
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tive outputs with them, subject to the risk of a later infringement claim.124
The employer, should they choose not to file a patent application, assumes
the risk that the employee takes the invention with them, and the em-
ployer has no recourse to prevent later disclosure or use of that invention
by the employee or subsequent employers.  Note that, under the patent
statutes, the previous employer’s ability to obtain a patent after the em-
ployee departure may be impacted by the employee’s use or disclosure of
the information after departure.125
Although not impacting patent ownership, the proposal does risk up-
setting the classic balance between patents and trade secrets where firms
are characterized as choosing between filing a patent application for in-
ventions that are readily discernable by the sale of the products that incor-
porate them (for which patent protection is the better option) and those
that are not (for which trade secrets provide better protection).126  Under
the proposal, the employer needs to consider not only the discoverability
of the invention in its products, but also the likelihood that the inventor
will leave and take the invention with them.  In this scenario, even when
the invention is not discernable from the marketed product, a patent ap-
plication may be the better option simply to avoid employees taking the
invention to other employers or establishing competing firms.  Alterna-
tively, when an invention is the product of many individual contributors
and the risk of any one inventor leaving with any portion of significant
independent value is small, the employer may choose trade secrets as the
most reasonable option.  Accordingly, the traditional balancing that firms
engage in between patents and trade secrets would be shifted under this
proposal, but not eradicated.
Some have suggested that trade secrets should be unavailable for pat-
entable inventions as a matter of policy.127  The argument is that firms
should be encouraged to disclose patentable inventions to the public
with—(A) any requirement of section 112, except that the failure to disclose the
best mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or
held invalid or otherwise unenforceable . . . .”).
124. Note that, over a sufficient time period, this would be the case even
under existing trade secrets law.  The change here is that the employee is free to
leave with their creative outputs even before the information becomes public
through publication or issuance of a patent application, which would not necessa-
rily be possible under existing trade secrets law.
125. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
126. See, e.g., Charles W. Herald, Trade Secrets as an Alternative to Patents, 9 AM
L. SCH. REV. 1107, 1108 (1941) (discussing the considerations when choosing be-
tween trade secrets and patent protection for firm innovation); Paul W. Leuzzi,
Process Inventions: Trade Secret or Patent Protection, 66 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 159, 159
(1984); Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial Perspective,
78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689, 691–93 (1996); Louis Orenbuch, Trade
Secrets and the Patent Laws, 52 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 638, 638 (1970) (discussing the
historical considerations in choosing between patents and trade secrets).
127. This notion that patentable inventions should not be eligible for trade
secrets protection is not new, and scholars made similar arguments around the
time of the Kewanee decision. See, e.g., Orenbuch, supra note 126, at 674 (arguing
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through the patent system, rather than keep them secret indefinitely.128
Such disclosure could be encouraged by the proposal here because it tilts
the scales in favor of disclosure by patent application by reducing the ex-
clusive rights the employer has in the invention because the inventor
could take the invention with them when they leave without fear of a mis-
appropriation claim.129  By encouraging disclosure through patent appli-
cation filing, the proposal may also address some of the preemption
concerns that were purportedly settled by Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron
Corporation,130 although the extent to which the issue was actually settled
was and continues to be subject to debate.131
As discussed in this Section, the proposal does not alter the tradi-
tional invention ownership relationship between employees and employ-
ers, and employers are free to continue to file patent applications for
employee inventions.  However, the traditional balancing that employers
undertake between trade secrets protection and patent protection would
likely be altered under the proposal.  This modification, while probably
not welcomed by employers, may provide a benefit to the public generally
by increasing disclosure of patentable inventions through the patenting
process.
2. Employers’ Rights in Registered Copyrights Are Also Not Affected
Similar to the patent case, employers’ rights in copyrighted creative
outputs are also not altered by the proposal.  To the extent an employer
that patentable inventions should not be protectable as trade secrets, particularly
in the employee-employer context).
128. Id.
129. Again, it is important to note that the employee does not have an exclu-
sive right in the invention they take with them, just an immunity of sorts from a
trade secrets misappropriation claim by their former employer.
130. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
131. The Kewanee case arose at a time when preemption of state trade secrets
law was a controversial topic. Kewanee purported to resolve the issue of preemp-
tion in favor of no preemption, but scholars continued to debate the scope of that
holding, particularly in view of the factual assumptions made by the Court. See
Steven M. Gloe, Patent Law—No Federal Preemption of State Trade Secret Law, 1974
WIS. L. REV. 1195 (1974) (critical review of the Court’s analytical approach in
Kewanee); Joseph H. Golani, Are Trade Secrets for Real?, 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 663
(1974) (critical review of Kewanee decision, arguing that a conflict between patent
law and trade secrets law remains); David Silverstein, Will Pre-Grant Patent Publica-
tion Undermine United States Trade Secret Law?, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 695, 723 (1995) (ques-
tioning the continuing viability of Kewanee, particularly in view of the proposal
(subsequently enacted) for pre-issuance publication of patent applications); Rich-
ard H. Stern, A Reexamination of Preemption of State Trade Secret Law After Kewanee, 42
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 927, 986–90 (1974) (questioning the Court’s analysis and ratio-
nale in Kewanee).  There has not been much discussion of preemption in the last
two decades, and with the passage of the DTSA, this is a much smaller issue than it
once was, but it is worth considering whether Kewanee could be revisited. See
Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to First Principles of Intellectual Prop-
erty Law to Determine the Issue of Federal Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
299 (2008).
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obtains a copyright registration132 for a particular creative output of an
employee, the departing employee is free to take that creative output with
them, subject to the possibility of a copyright infringement claim.133  In
view of this, one possible reaction to the proposal would be for employers
to simply file copyright registrations for all of the copyrightable creative
outputs in the firm to limit employees’ ability to take any creative outputs
with them.  This is a substantial concern and could significantly blunt the
impact of the proposal, particularly in the software context.  However,
there are additional challenges in the copyright context that might make
this outcome less likely.
First, the information that a firm wants to protect, for example, a
computer program, may exist in multiple iterations before the final prod-
uct is developed.134  It would be a significant burden for a firm to have to
register all of the interim iterations of the work in order to protect the
innovation in the project from an employee departure, particularly where
entire sections of the code may change significantly through the develop-
ment and debugging process.  Second, copyright registration includes a
publication requirement, and the firm may not want to disclose the infor-
mation publicly simply to prevent an employee from leaving with the in-
formation.135  This might be the case with, for example, statistical data on
firm diversity or other information that would be embarrassing to the
firm.136  In this case, however, it is unclear whether this information genu-
inely constitutes the creative outputs of an individual employee, so it may
be protectable as general business confidential information during the
term of employment and after, according to agency law.137  Third, signifi-
132. Note that unlike patents, copyrights arise upon creation rather than re-
gistration.  However, copyright registration is required if the owner intends to as-
sert their rights through litigation.
133. Copyright law actually could present a substantial challenge to accom-
plishing the goal of recognizing employee rights in particular creative outputs,
especially those that are readily copyrightable.  Whether through the “work made
for hire” provision, see 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2018), or through contract, the employer is
likely to be the owner of any copyrightable work product the employee creates.
Moreover, copyright law provides for statutory damages, even in the absence of
actual damages. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2018).  Thus, for copyrightable material, the
employer may have a ready and effective work-around to the proposal presented in
this Article.
134. See, e.g., Thomas J. Ryan Jr, The Flexibility Factor in Copyright, Trade Secret
and Patent Law for Computer Software: The Aftermath of Sony, 11 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
333, 334 (1984) (discussing the development cycle for software as it existed at that
time).
135. This is less of a concern for software because the registrant is not re-
quired to reveal all of their code to register their software. See U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, CIRCULAR 61: COPYRIGHT REGISTRATIONS FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS (2020).
136. For a discussion of whether firms should be able to protect such informa-
tion though trade secrets law, see Jamillah Bowman Williams, Diversity as a Trade
Secret, 107 GEO. L.J. 1684 (2019).
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An
agent has a duty . . . not to use or communicate confidential information of the
principal for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party.”).
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cant copyrightable works, such as computer programs, are more likely to
be collective works that are not easily separable138 into constituent parts
having separate authorship.139
For each of these reasons, forcing employers to choose between filing
copyright registrations for materials that they would not otherwise file and
leaving the innovation unregistered and subject to employee departure is
more challenging than on the patent side.140  Nevertheless, should an em-
ployer choose to register their copyrights on particular creative outputs,
those copyrights could be enforced against the departing employee (and
their subsequent employer) even if trade secrets law does not prevent the
employee from taking the materials.  Accordingly, the employer’s rights
under copyright law would not be impacted by the proposal, but the em-
ployer’s copyright registration practices might be.
3. Registered (or Unregistered) Trademarks Are Not Impacted by the Proposal
Trademarks are the easiest case of the three because trademark rights
arise exclusively through use of the associated trademark in commerce.141
An individual employee would almost certainly not be using a trademark
in commerce in their individual capacity and thus would not have any
trademark rights in a mark, even if they were the sole creator of the
mark.142  The employee may have a copyright interest (particularly in the
case of design marks), but the employee’s ability to make any use of that
interest after departing the employer would be significantly curtailed, if
not eradicated, by the left-behind employer’s registered or common law
trademark rights.  Moreover, firms have significant incentives to pursue
138. Separable is being used here in the sense of being able to readily distin-
guish portions of a joint work that were created by one author or coder as opposed
to another.  It is not being used in the copyright law sense of whether a work’s
copyrightable expression is separable from its functional features.
139. This could present a challenge for both the departing employee and the
left-behind employer for determining what the employee can take with them.
140. At the time of this writing, Congress just enacted the Copyright Alterna-
tive in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2020, which may significantly alter a com-
pany’s behavior with respect to copyright protection generally and specifically to
protection of employee-created copyrightable works. See 17 U.S.C.A 1501 et seq.
(West 2020).
141. For purposes of federal registration at least.  Individual state statutes may
alter or modify this requirement for registrations within their jurisdictions, but a
state-by-state review of trademark statutes is beyond the scope of this Article.
142. For purposes of this discussion, the Article does not address the compli-
cated, but potentially relevant, issue of employee rights in work-related social me-
dia accounts.  For a discussion of those issues, see Marisa Warren & Arnie
Pedowitz, Social Media, Trade Secrets, Duties of Loyalty, Restrictive Covenants and Yes, the
Sky is Falling, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 99 (2011) and Anthony C. Adornato &
Andrew S. Horsfall, Failed Strategy: Using Trade Secret Laws to Assert Ownership of Em-
ployees’ Social Media Accounts in the Journalism Industry, 9 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. &
ENT. L. 62 (2020).
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trademark registration143 independent of any rights employees have in
their creative outputs and those incentives are not modified by the exis-
tence of any employee rights in their creative outputs.  Thus, trademark
law does not present a significant challenge to the proposal presented
here and employer’s trademark rights are unlikely to be impacted by the
proposal.
4. The Overall Impact of the Proposal on Registered IP Is Minimal
In summary, the proposal here places a burden on employers in the
patent case by altering the traditional balancing done by firms in deciding
whether to choose patent protection or trade secrets protection for inno-
vation occurring within the firm.  That additional burden is at least some-
what offset by the benefit to the public of increased disclosure of
patentable innovation.  Copyrights may provide an avenue for employers
to perform an end-run around the proposal, but that would require em-
ployers to significantly ramp up their copyright registration approach and
there are several factors that make that a less attractive option for employ-
ers.  Finally, because trademark rights arise from use, rather than from
creation or invention, it is highly unlikely that the employer’s trademark
rights would be impacted by the proposal.  Accordingly, although the pro-
posal curtails employer rights to employee innovations, it still leaves sub-
stantial room for firms to use other forms of intellectual property
protection to protect key innovation within the firm.
C. Employee Solicitations Are Likely to Increase
Although the majority of trade secrets cases involve employees that
leave to join another firm (or start their own) of their own volition, there
are those cases in which a competing firm actively solicits employees for
the purpose of obtaining access to technology.144  If the proposal were
adopted, one likely impact would be an increase in employee solicitations
for the purposes of obtaining technology.  The employee that simply takes
with them trade secrets that are not the product of their creative outputs
would fall (along with the soliciting employer) squarely within existing
trade secrets law because the trade secrets misappropriated in this scena-
rio would not necessarily fall within the employee’s general skills and
143. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2018) (registration serves as constructive no-
tice of ownership); 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2018) (registration provides prima facie evi-
dence of the validity of the mark, ownership, and exclusive right to use the mark in
commerce).
144. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Uptake Techs., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 3d 815, 833
(N.D. Ill. 2019) (defendants accused of using trade secret information to lure away
employees); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prods., Inc., 179 N.Y.S. 325, 330
(App. Div. 1919) (newly-founded company solicits employees to leave previously-
operating competitor); Reynolds v. Sanchez Oil & Gas Corp., 617 S.W.3d 30, 35–36
(Tex. App. 2020) (competitor soliciting employees leads to misappropriation
claim).
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knowledge, as proposed here.145  Accordingly, we are left with the narrow
case in which an employee is solicited by a new employer for the purpose
of obtaining that employee’s creative outputs.
It is important to note that simply soliciting employees (even to ob-
tain their general skills and knowledge) is not unfair competition.146  Re-
gardless, firms are unlikely to see this as a desirable outcome147 and
therefore may take steps to prevent employee departures or limit em-
ployee solicitations.  These steps might include increased retention efforts
(e.g., higher wages, increased benefits, and the like), which would be posi-
tive for employees, but they also could include steps that negatively impact
employment conditions, such as tighter infrastructure security, less collab-
oration, and reduced innovation incentives.  However, so long as sufficient
mobility exists, employees will likely have opportunities to move and will
likely do so if sufficient benefits (e.g., increased wages) to doing so exist.
Looking solely to the departing employee does not provide a com-
plete analysis, however, because to understand the net impact of increased
employee solicitations, we also have to consider the impacts on the em-
ployee pool as a whole.  Under the proposal, innovative employees may be
able to disproportionately obtain the benefits of increased mobility (i.e.,
increased wages or benefits), while less-innovative employees dispropor-
tionately suffer the negative impacts (e.g., reduced wages or benefits), de-
pending on how employers choose to respond to the proposal.
Consequently, the net effect of the proposal (due to employee solicita-
tions) for innovative employees is likely to be positive, but it is unclear
whether the impact on the employee pool as a whole would be positive or
145. This assumes that the information taken otherwise qualifies for trade se-
cret protection (e.g., it does not fit within the general skills and knowledge exclu-
sion, independent of the proposal) and the other requirements of a trade secrets
misappropriation claim are met.
146. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (AM. LAW INST.
1995) (discussing firms’ freedom to compete).
147. Without a doubt, there are some scenarios where an employee taking
their creative outputs to a new employer for higher wages (or some other benefit)
would feel unfair, particularly to the left-behind employer.  In particular, where
the employee was one of relatively few key employees whose primary job function
was to innovate around the employer’s key product(s), service(s), or process(es),
this may seem less fair.  Moreover, where the employee was paid a higher wage at
the left-behind employer specifically for their innovative outputs (as opposed to a
market-based wage), the employee absconding with those innovative outputs
might also feel less fair.  Finally, when the employee takes many months or years to
generate the innovations that ultimately lead to a significant product for the com-
pany and the new employer is able to bring a competing product to market in a
relatively short time, this may also seem unfair.  Trade secrets law currently ad-
dresses these issues (subject to the general skills and knowledge exclusion), but it
would no longer do so under the proposal.  It is also important to note that the
effect of these particular scenarios may fall more heavily on small or startup busi-
nesses and thus, there may be a disproportionate impact on these businesses from
the proposal.
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol66/iss3/2
2021] EMPLOYEE CREATIVE OUTPUTS 565
negative.148  In any case, the net impact on employers from increased
competitive solicitation is likely to be negative due to increased costs of
labor, reduced innovation, and reduced ability to exclusively capitalize on
employee-generated innovation.
D. Employers May Revert to Breach of Contract Claims to Protect Firm
Innovation
One of the challenges to recognizing a broad right by employees to
their creative outputs is that almost all employees are now required to sign
a confidentiality and invention assignment agreement (CIAA)149 at the
time of hiring.150  Thus, any attempt to recognize employee rights in their
creative outputs would potentially run afoul of these agreements.  The de-
velopment of trade secrets law is at least partially responsible for the preva-
lence of these agreements.  The UTSA formalized a previously common
law requirement151 that the trade secrets owner engaged in reasonable
efforts to protect the purported trade secrets.152  The reasonable efforts
requirement can present a substantial hurdle to prevailing in a trade se-
cret case.153  Over time, courts came to view employee confidentiality
148. One issue not addressed here is what happens when a soliciting em-
ployer requires disclosure of the employee’s creative outputs as part of the solicita-
tion process, but then either the soliciting employer does not hire the employee or
the employee chooses not to leave their current position or accept the soliciting
employer’s offer of employment.  If the current employer were to discover the
disclosure, the employee would probably be terminated and possibly liable under
an agency law or breach of contract claim, see infra Sections IV.D and IV.F, but the
soliciting employer would probably not have any liability.  The likelihood of this
scenario may depend on how savvy employees are to the limits of their rights in
their own creative outputs and their obligations under agency law and contracts.
149. As used here, this is just a general acronym to capture some form of
written agreement that requires an employee to protect employer proprietary in-
formation (which may or may not be trade secret) and to assign all creative out-
puts to the employer, independent of whether those outputs are copyrightable,
patentable, or trade secrets eligible.  For examples of the provisions in these agree-
ments, see supra notes 74 and 91.
150. See supra note 10.
151. See Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Comput. Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 700 (Minn.
1982) (reviewing cases addressing the reasonable efforts requirement).
152. The UTSA provides, “ ‘Trade secret’ means information, including a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process,
that . . . is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N amended
1985).
153. See, e.g., Deegan v. Strategic Azimuth LLC, 768 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112
(D.D.C. 2011) (“The Court questions whether a simple notation of ‘strictly confi-
dential’ on a document is enough to reasonably maintain the secrecy of the con-
tents of that document.”); Krawiec v. Manly, 811 S.E.2d 542, 549 (N.C. 2018)
(“Plaintiffs’ amended complaint is devoid of any allegation of a method, plan, or
other act by which they attempted to maintain the secrecy of the [alleged trade
secrets.]”); see also Trygve Meade, Indecision: The Need to Reform the Reasonable Secrecy
Precautions Requirement Under Trade Secret Law, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 717, 721, 724 (2013)
(reviewing the reasonable efforts requirement and proposing that small businesses
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agreements as an important indicator of the reasonable efforts require-
ment.154  Accordingly, many employers now require CIAA agreements be
signed by all employees at the time of hiring.155  In some cases, employers
even require a CIAA from employees whom are almost certainly not hired
to innovate and whose exposure to trade secrets is merely incidental to the
job responsibilities they were hired to do.156
Additionally, these CIAA agreements are so broadly worded that they
cover any and all information that the employee interacts with during
should be held to a different standard); Patrick P. Phillips, The Concept of Reasona-
bleness in the Protection of Trade Secrets, 42 BUS. LAW. 1045, 1046 (1987) (reviewing
cases where courts addressed the reasonable efforts requirement); David W. Slaby,
James C. Chapman & Gregory P. O’Hara, Trade Secret Protection: An Analysis of the
Concept “Efforts Reasonable Under the Circumstances to Maintain Secrecy”, 5 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 321, 324 (1989) (discussing the development and
application of the reasonable efforts requirement); Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret
Precautions, Possession, and Notice, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 357, 360 (2017) (“Many a plain-
tiff has lost her case based on a failure to show adequate precautions.”).
154. See, e.g., Prime Therapeutics LLC v. Beatty, 354 F. Supp. 3d 957, 968 (D.
Minn. 2018) (finding “confidentiality agreements, password-protected documents,
and annual affirmance of ongoing confidentiality obligations” as reasonable ef-
forts); see also Victoria A. Cundiff, Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets in a
Digital Environment, 49 IDEA—INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 359, 375 (2009) (reviewing
reasonable efforts decisions addressing employee confidentiality agreements);
Varadarajan, supra note 153, at 373 (discussing reasonable efforts requirement and
asserting “imposing confidentiality agreements on employees” as one measure
courts look to in evaluating the requirement); Deepa Varadarajan, The Trade Secret-
Contract Interface, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1543, 1556 (2018) (“[C]ourts consider non-
disclosure contracts to be important evidence in trade secret cases.”).
155. See supra note 10.
156. See, e.g., Sandeen & Rowe, supra note 92, at 440 (referencing the use of
non-compete agreements by employers of low-wage and low-skilled workers); Orly
Lobel, NDAs Are Out of Control. Here’s What Needs to Change, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.
30, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-to-
change [https://perma.cc/U2P8-8R45] (discussing routine use of NDAs by em-
ployers).  To the extent we consider requiring these agreements from all employ-
ees to be reasonable because of the notice function they provide employees, see
Varadarajan, supra note 154, at 1560 (arguing that the notice function of contracts
should be recognized by courts in trade secrets cases); Don Wiesner & Anita Cava,
Stealing Trade Secrets Ethically, 47 MD. L. REV. 1076, 1107 (1988) (discussing the
issue of contractual notice in trade secrets cases), the current state of “everything is
proprietary information/trade secret” can’t possibly provide such notice unless
one embraces the notion that every piece of information within a company is pro-
prietary or trade secret.  But, we know that everything cannot be a trade secret,
even in the context of software. See, e.g., IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d
581, 583 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Thus to show that particular information is a trade se-
cret, a firm such as IDX must demonstrate that it is valuable, not known to others
who might profit by its use, and has been handled by means reasonably designed
to maintain secrecy.  Like the district judge, we think that IDX failed to do this.  It
has been both too vague and too inclusive, effectively asserting that all information
in or about its software is a trade secret.”).  Conceptually, we also know this cannot
be the case because we know that employees interact with information fitting into
the category of general skills and knowledge that cannot be trade secrets of the
employer. See infra Section III.A.
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their employment.157  Regardless of whether particular information quali-
fies as a trade secret, it will almost certainly fit within the definition of
confidential or proprietary information covered by these CIAA agree-
ments.  Accordingly, even in the absence of a viable trade secrets claim
with respect to employee creative outputs, an employer may still bring a
breach of contract claim to enforce restrictions on information
portability.158
Nevertheless, breach of contract claims are not a perfect substitute for
trade secrets misappropriation claims for a variety of reasons.  First, in or-
der for a contract to be a useful tool to govern individual behavior, there
needs to be some cognizable damages available for breach and, arguably,
the available damages need to be greater than the cost of bringing suit
against the individual for breach.159  However, in the absence of a misap-
propriation claim, the damages available may not be economically signifi-
cant because the plaintiff may not be able to show that the taking of the
information caused any actual damages.160  Moreover, lower-level employ-
157. See, e.g., Brown v. TGS Mgmt. Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303, 317 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2020), as modified on denial of reh’g (Nov. 12, 2020), review filed (Dec. 21,
2020) (finding overly broad confidentiality provisions operated as a de facto
noncompete provision); see also Pamela Carder Fletcher, Antitrust Implications Aris-
ing from the Use of Overly Broad Restrictive Covenants for the Protection of Trade Secrets, 29
HASTINGS L.J. 297, 306 (1977) (discussing overly-broad confidentiality provisions in
employment agreements and asserting that employees have no choice but to agree
if they want the job).
158. Note that the UTSA does not preempt breach of contract claims related
to information disclosure. See UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACTS § 7 (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N
amended 1985) (“This [Act] does not affect . . . contractual remedies, whether or
not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret . . . .”).
159. This assumes, of course, that the employer is not simply bringing suit
against a departing employee (or their new employer) as an example to others and
is therefore willing to spend the unrecoverable costs simply to make the example.
Regardless, some cognizable damages are an essential element of a breach of con-
tract claim. See, e.g., Innova Hosp. San Antonio, L.P. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Georgia, Inc., 892 F.3d 719, 731 (5th Cir. 2018) (listing essential elements of
breach of contract claim under Texas law, including “damages sustained as a result
of the breach” (quoting Electrostim Med. Servs., Inc. v. Health Care Serv. Corp.,
614 Fed. Appx. 731, 739 (5th Cir. 2015))); Doe v. Bank of Am. Corp., 273 F. Supp.
3d 203, 211 (D.D.C. 2017) (listing the elements of a breach of contract claim,
including damages, in multiple jurisdictions; Deauville Hotel Mgmt. v. Ward, 219
So. 3d 949, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (“To prevail in a breach of contract
action, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a valid contract existed; (2) a material breach of
the contract; and (3) damages.” (citing Murciano v. Garcia, 958 So. 2d 423 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007))).
160. See, e.g., Recif Res., LLC v. Juniper Capital Advisors, L.P., No. CV H-19-
2953, 2020 WL 6748049, at *101 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2020) (plaintiff seeks nominal
damages because no evidence that confidential information was used by disc-
losee); Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Sols., Inc. v. Renesas Elecs. Am. Inc., No.
4:08-CV-00451, 2020 WL 1495230, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2020) (discussing jury
award of only nominal damages for “retention” of confidential information, but
$12 million in damages as a reasonable royalty for “use” of the confidential infor-
mation); Enzo Life Scis., Inc. v. Adipogen Corp., 82 F. Supp. 3d 568, 607 (D. Del.
2015) (plaintiff awarded nominal damages of $10 for breach of confidentiality pro-
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ees are likely to be judgment proof in that they are unlikely to have assets
sufficient to satisfy a judgment of sufficient size to justify the costs of bring-
ing suit.  It is actually the trade secrets claim that bolts on the remedies
that are most likely to address or deter misappropriation.  These remedies
include injunctive relief and damages based upon plaintiff’s lost profits
and defendant’s unjust enrichment (as long as the damages are not dupli-
cative).161  These remedies simply may not be available in a breach of con-
tract action.162
The second issue is that, except in the case of the departing employee
that is going on to establish their own competing company, there is no
privity of contract with the person or entity most likely to benefit from the
misappropriation,163 which is the new employer.  Consequently, in the ab-
sence of inducement to breach, a breach of contract claim may not be
available against the new employer.  Third, valid contracts require consid-
eration.164  However, in the employment context, the employee is simply
handed a form agreement (along with a plethora of other agreements and
forms),165 and asked to sign them as a condition of their employment.166
No consideration (beyond the employment itself) is asked or bargained
for.167  The employee simply signs the form (most likely without reading
vision because plaintiff could not establish any actual damages caused by the
breach); Osseiran v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 2d 201, 212 (D.D.C. 2013)
(plaintiff did not establish that breach of confidentiality agreement caused the
alleged damage and thus was awarded only nominal damages); Silicon Image, Inc.
v. Analogix Semiconductor, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 957, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (pre-
cluding presentation of actual damages related to breach of confidentiality provi-
sion, but allowing breach claim to proceed for nominal damages).
161. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Unpacking Trade Secret Damages, 55 HOUS. L. REV.
155, 159 (2017) (discussing types of damages available in trade secrets cases).
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (“Contract damages are ordinarily based on the injured party’s expectation
interest and are intended to give him the benefit of his bargain by awarding him a
sum of money that will, to the extent possible, put him in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract been performed.”).  On the issue of injunc-
tions, irreparable harm would also need to be proven to get an injunction in a
breach of contract case. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20
(2008).
163. Certainly, an argument could be made that the employee receives some
benefit by being paid a higher wage at the new employer, but as of the writing of
this Article, this author has not found any cases where the damages theory contem-
plated the departing employee’s new wages.
164. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 71–81 (AM. LAW
INST. 1981).
165. These other agreements and forms might include: immigration forms,
tax paperwork, employee manuals, and instructions for setting up IT accounts,
among other things.
166. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 157, at 306.
167. Note that the employment itself can provide sufficient consideration in
many jurisdictions when the confidentiality agreement is signed at the commence-
ment of employment. See Sandeen & Rowe, supra note 92, at 448.
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it)168 because they have no other realistic option.169  Consequently, the
validity of the contract could be subject to attack.170
Notwithstanding these issues with enforcing employee contracts, in
the absence of any other meaningful remedy for an employee departing
with information important to the employer, employers are likely to bring
breach of contract claims in an effort to prevent the employee from taking
the information.  Moreover, broad CIAAs, if enforced on their terms, pro-
vide a solid foundation for such actions.  Consequently, one likely impact
if the proposal were adopted is an increase in breach of contract claims
against departing employees directed at preventing employees from leav-
ing with their creative outputs.171
E. Employers May Place More Emphasis on Computer Fraud and Abuse Act or
Theft Claims to Regulate the Type of Conduct Previously Addressed
by Trade Secrets Law
One of the pieces of baggage that trade secrets law has been carrying
since the beginning is its close association with wrongful or immoral con-
duct, viewed from both a personal perspective and a commercial perspec-
tive.172  An underlying premise of this Article is that it is not wrongful or
immoral for a departing employee to take their own creative outputs with
168. See Sommers, supra note 14, at 2 (“One of the most important features of
today’s consumer contracts is that almost no one reads them.” (citations omit-
ted)).  This assumes that the same, or similar, considerations that limit individuals’
reading of consumer contracts also apply in the employment context.
169. Obviously, the employee could refuse to sign the form and go find an-
other job.  However, due to the widespread use of these forms in businesses of all
industries and sizes, the employee will almost certainly be expected to sign a simi-
lar form at other employers.
170. One might reasonably question whether a rational employee in an arms-
length bargaining scenario would agree to such a broadly worded and completely
one-sided agreement along the lines of the CIAA described here.  In fact, the em-
ployer has every incentive to make the agreements as protective of the proprietary
and trade secrets information as possible because, in addition to bolstering their
chances in a breach of contract action, doing so creates the appearance of the
employer doing everything possible to establish reasonable efforts for a trade
secrets claim. But see Brown v. TGS Mgmt. Co., 271, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303, 318 (Ct.
App. 2020) (holding that overly broad provisions in an employee confidentiality
agreement acted as a non-compete in violation of California statutory prohibition
on employee non-competes).
171. This author actually considers this result to be a feature of the proposal,
rather than a bug, because it would encourage courts to dig deeply into the equi-
ties in these employment contracting situations, rather than relying on trade
secrets misappropriation claims to provide a ready escape route.
172. See, e.g.,18 U.S.C.A. § 1839 (West 2018) (“[T]he term ‘improper
means’—(A) includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of
a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other
means . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1939)
(“Among the means which are improper are theft, trespass, bribing or otherwise
inducing employees or others to reveal the information in breach of duty, fraudu-
lent misrepresentations, threats of harm by unlawful conduct, wire tapping, pro-
curing one’s own employees or agents to become employees of the other for
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them when changing employers.  To the extent that a departing em-
ployee’s conduct is otherwise wrongful at or near the time of departure,
other legal regimes should address this conduct.  For example, to the ex-
tent the employee leaves with tangible items of any significant value, vari-
ous state and federal theft or conversion laws may provide a cause of
action for the aggrieved employer.
In the much more likely scenario that tangible items are not at issue
or are not of significant value in comparison to the intangibles taken (e.g.,
the information was taken through electronic means), other statutes like
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) could provide either a civil or
criminal remedy for employers.173  Of course, to provide an adequate
remedy, courts would need to interpret certain provisions of the CFAA in
such a way that it generally covers employees removing information
through electronic means.  This is not currently how the statute is inter-
preted.174  However, in the absence of trade secrets protection, employers
may actively push for a broader interpretation of the CFAA or legislative
reform to address this particular form of employee conduct.
Because theft statutes and the CFAA are more directly focused on the
conduct of the employee, rather than the employer’s rights in an intangi-
ble, they may provide a better vector for the law to develop around depart-
ing employees leaving with employer information in nefarious fashion (or
any fashion).  In particular, these approaches may provide a better oppor-
tunity to litigate what specific conduct is actionable irrespective of the con-
tent of the information that was taken.  As an example, the location of the
information prior to departure (e.g., company-provided versus employee-
provided equipment) may be a relevant consideration.  In any case, theft
statutes and the CFAA do not currently provide robust protections for em-
ployer trade secrets, but employers may increasingly look to these alterna-
tive causes of action should their ability to bring trade secrets claims based
on employee’s creative outputs be eliminated, as proposed here.
purposes of espionage, and so forth.”); Steiner, supra note 5, at 377 (describing
employee departing with trade secret as “obviously fraudulent”).
173. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018).  For a discussion of the CFAA as an alterna-
tive to trade secrets law, see Paul Hanna & Matthew Leal, The Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act: An Attractive but Risky Alternative to Texas Trade Secret Law, 45 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 491 (2014).
174. See Royal Truck & Trailer Sales & Serv. v. Kraft, 974 F.3d 756, 760 (6th
Cir. 2020) (affirming motion to dismiss based on narrow reading of “exceeds au-
thorized access” in CFAA).  This issue has been litigated for many years with courts
primarily using a narrow construction.  For one of the earliest cases addressing this
issue, see LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009).  For a
more famous (and protracted) case addressing this issue, see United States v.
Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) and its lengthy procedural history, including
Supreme Court decisions.  The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue and
held in favor of a narrower interpretation of the statute. See Van Buren v. United
States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1662 (2021).
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F. Employers May Look to Agency Law as an Alternative to Trade Secrets Law
Despite the fact that the UTSA contains language purporting to pre-
empt state law causes of action tied to misappropriation of information,175
and the fact that recognizing other state law causes of action in litigation
over information may be error,176 courts continue to entertain both trade
secrets claims and agency law claims related to information in the same
suit.177  Accordingly, existing agency law may provide a work-around for
employers if the proposal were adopted.
According to the Restatement (Third) of Agency (“RTA”), employees
have an obligation to maintain their employer’s confidential information,
during and after the time of employment.178  Accordingly, an employer
concerned with employees departing with valuable trade secrets that the
individual employees themselves created, simply needs to ensure that all
such trade secrets are classified as confidential information179 and then
175. Section 7 of the UTSA states, “Except as provided in subsection (b), this
[Act] displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this State providing
civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.” UNIF. TRADE SECRET ACT § 7
(UNIF. LAW. COMM’N Amended 1985).
176. See, e.g., StoneCoat of Texas, LLC v. ProCal Stone Design, LLC, 426 F.
Supp. 3d 311, 339 (E.D. Tex. 2019) (finding claims of conversion, unfair competi-
tion, and tortious interference preempted by Texas trade secrets statute); Agilysys,
Inc. v. Hall, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (“These are the same
factual allegations underlying Plaintiff’s GTSA claim, and therefore, the tortious
interference claim is preempted as to both Defendants to the extent Plaintiff relies
on the misappropriation of information.” (citing Diamond Power Int’l, Inc. v. Da-
vidson,  540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2007))); Firetrace USA, LLC v. Jes-
clard, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1049 (D. Ariz. 2010) (“Because a different
interpretation would undermine the statute’s purpose, the Court is persuaded that
the AUTSA preempts all Plaintiffs’ common law tort claims based on the misappro-
priation of information, whether or not that information meets the statutory defi-
nition of a trade secret.”).
177. See Garfias v. Portland Spray Works, Inc., No. 3:20-CV-00873-IM, 2021 WL
27456, at *7 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2021) (discussing preemption under Oregon UTSA
and holding breach of fiduciary duty claim not preempted because “information
alleged to have been used by Plaintiff encompass a broader category beyond ‘trade
secret’ information within the meaning of OTSA.”); Prairie Field Servs., LLC v.
Welsh, No. 20-CV-2160 (ECT/KMM), 2020 WL 6336705, at *11 (D. Minn. Oct. 29,
2020) (holding that breach of duty of loyalty claim was not preempted for confi-
dential information that was not a trade secret); Hauck Mfg. Co. v. Astec Indus.,
375 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (reviewing decisions from around the
country on the issue of UTSA preemption); see also Robert Unikel, Bridging the
“Trade Secret” Gap: Protecting “Confidential Information” Not Rising to the Level of Trade
Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 882–85 (1998) (reviewing different courts’ and
states’ approaches to the UTSA preemption provision).
178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An
agent has a duty . . . not to use or communicate confidential information of the
principal for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party.”).
179. One way an employer might accomplish this is to ensure each employee
signs a broad confidentiality agreement upon employment. See, e.g., Cisco Sys.,
Inc. v. Chung, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“As a condition of his
employment, Chung signed a Proprietary Information and Inventions Agreement
(“PIIA”), which, among other things, prohibited him from maintaining simultane-
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rely on agency law to ensure the employee cannot disclose the informa-
tion after departing, assuming this provision of the RTA is consistent with
available state law.  In those jurisdictions applying the view that common
law agency torts based on confidential information that is not trade secret
are not preempted, common law tort claims could provide an end-run
around the proposal in this Article.
Nevertheless, there are some mitigations to this impact to consider.
First, agency law is solely a creature of state law and thus does not provide
a federal cause of action for the employer, or access to federal courts.180
Accordingly, agency law may be less attractive to employers for attempting
to address this issue.  Second, agency law is directed to “confidential infor-
mation of the principal,” which may not include an employee’s creative
outputs absent an agreement to that effect.181  Consequently, agency law
may address some scenarios the employer would like to prevent but not
others.182  Finally, the agency law approach may suffer from the same con-
tract formation defects issue discussed above, assuming courts are willing
to question the validity of these form employment agreements.183  Thus,
agency law may provide a work-around for employers but, at least as it
exists today, agency law would not completely blunt the impact of imple-
mentation of the proposal in this Article.
G. Employers May Use Independent Contractor Agreements to Avoid the
Impacts of the Proposal
Along with the rise of the gig economy, firms have found indepen-
dent contractor agreements to be an effective method of reducing the
burdens and obligations of traditional employment on the firm.184  The
widespread use of independent contractor agreements, even if not formal-
ized beyond the “Accept” screen of the associated app, also could provide
a work-around for the proposal here.  In particular, if employers come to
believe that independent contractor arrangements (which are essentially
ous employment with any industry competitor, barred him from removing any
plaintiff information except as necessary to perform his employment duties, and
required that he return all plaintiff information upon termination of his
employment.”).
180. Except in diversity cases.  For a discussion of how employers in the pre-
DTSA era boot-strapped other claims onto what were essentially trade secrets ac-
tions to access federal courts, see Graham M. Liccardi, Comment, The Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. MAR-
SHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 155 (2008).
181. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (Am. Law Inst. 2006).
182. Scenarios that would be addressed include those in which an employee
leaves for another employer and discloses preexisting trade secrets to the new em-
ployer.  Scenarios not addressed would include those in which an employee leaves
to establish a competing firm using the employee’s own creative outputs.
183. See supra Section IV.D.
184. See Andrew G. Malik, Worker Classification and the Gig-Economy, 69 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1729 (2017); Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA.
L. REV. 1415 (2018).
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purely contractual relationships) are a better approach to engaging crea-
tive labor and protecting the resulting innovation, employers may shift a
larger portion of their workforce to such arrangements.  The agreements
memorializing these arrangements will almost certainly contain broad as-
signments of all creative outputs of the contractor to the firm, and there is
no reason to suspect that courts will not enforce these provisions.185  Ac-
cordingly, this proposal could result in a further shift by innovative firms
away from salaried employees toward independent contractor relation-
ships, which to date, have not been the subject of a significant shift in this
direction.186
On the other hand, the gig economy is a relatively new phenomenon
and legal responses are still in their infancy.187  Additionally, some states
are already taking legislative action to address the impact of the gig econ-
omy on workers.188  Accordingly, this issue may be less likely to manifest in
the way posited here with the passage of time.  Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to consider how employers might use independent contractor ar-
rangements to attempt to counteract the proposal, if it were to be
adopted.
CONCLUSION
As discussed herein, it is time to revisit whether the notion of em-
ployer sole ownership of the creative outputs of employees is equitable,
efficient, or consistent with what modern employees understand about
their personal and intellectual autonomy and their role in the workplace.
This Article proposes that employees should have continuing rights in
their own creative outputs and that trade secrets law should not act as a
vehicle to extinguish those rights.  The approach proposed here is a minor
adjustment to the existing general skills and knowledge exclusion, yet it is
a significant change for employees and gives them significantly more con-
trol over their personal creative outputs than is possible under existing
trade secrets law.
185. The area most heavily litigated on these gig economy agreements is the
arbitration provision, but courts have consistently enforced the provisions. See gen-
erally Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016); Kai Peng v.
Uber Techs., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 3d 36 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Lee v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
208 F. Supp. 3d 886 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
186. See Matthew L. Timko, The Gig Economy: An Annotated Bibliography, 39 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 361, 362 (2019) (identifying “transportation, food delivery, and
grocery shopping” as having been impacted by the rise of the gig economy).
187. See generally, Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of Employment and
Labor Law, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 51 (2017); Michael L. Nadler, Independent Employees: A
New Category of Workers for the Gig Economy, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 443 (2018); James
de Haan, Comment, The Uber-Union: Re-Thinking Collective Bargaining for the Gig
Economy, 12 CHARLESTON L. REV. 99 (2017).
188. See Isaac Arreola, AB5 Is Causing a Hurdle for the Gig Economy: What Are
Independent Contractors to Do When They Cannot Find Work in the Middle of a Pandemic?,
ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Summer 2020, at 25 (2020) (discussing California’s recent
legislation directed to protecting gig economy workers).
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Returning to the plight of our software engineer from the Introduc-
tion, if the proposal were to be adopted as proposed in this Article, they
would be able to take the fruits of their creative outputs to any future
employer or start up a competing business of their own utilizing their crea-
tive outputs.  Moreover, the engineer could rely on those aspects of their
creative output in memory without fear of a misappropriation claim, could
seek out new employment without having the baggage of their prior em-
ployment impacting their ability to take new work or making that work less
efficient, and could take their own contributions to their previous em-
ployer’s codebase with them in electronic or hard-copy form.  Thus, over
time, they are free to build their own personal repository of their prior
work and use that prior work in all future endeavors.  Consequently, the
departing employee will have achieved greater autonomy and control over
their own creative outputs over the life of their career, which was the goal
set forth in this Article.
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